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A SEA CHANGE OFF THE COAST OF MAINE: COMMON
POOL RESOURCES AS CULTURAL PROPERTY
Pammela Quinn Saunders∗
ABSTRACT
In groundbreaking and award-winning research, social scientists have
documented the power of small groups to manage common pool resources
(CPRs). That research concludes that collective or communal ownership of
CPRs may be optimal in certain circumstances. While group- and communitylevel rights have also sometimes been conceived in property law terms, these
accounts have not focused on whether and how to protect existing groups
whose successful management of CPRs has been documented. The idea that
such a movement might occur, and what form it should take, is ripe for
consideration and evaluation.
In this Article, I use an initiative currently being advanced by a community
of Maine lobstermen to create and illustrate a model that might be broadly
used for the recognition of group-level property rights in communities, or
other groups, that are the de facto stewards of CPRs. Describing both when
and how such a community-level right might be recognized and what its
substantive contours should be, the Article draws not only from the recent
social science research that recognizes the benefits of small group
management of CPRs, but also from the growing field of cultural property
rights, in which group-level rights have already been embraced in both
domestic and international law.

∗ Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Drexel University, The Earle Mack School of Law. J.D., Duke
University School of Law; A.B., Dartmouth College. I would like to thank Blake Hudson, Hannah Wiseman,
Nathan Saunders, and Dorothy Mayville for reading earlier drafts and providing excellent suggestions, all of
which have greatly improved this Article. I am also very grateful for the assistance of Drexel law librarian
John Cannan, whose ability to locate ancient and obscure sources is unparalleled. And my most particular
thanks go to Matinicus Island lobsterman-lawyer Nat Hussey, who provided me with expert, firsthand
accounts of Matinicus Island, its current plight, and its efforts to obtain subzone recognition—and who also
generously loaned me a copy of the hard-to-obtain (and fascinating) Tales of Matinicus Island. Any errors and
omissions are, of course, solely my own.
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INTRODUCTION
We’re looking at it from a community conservation point of
view . . . . If we lose control of who fishes the bottom, then we lose
the town.
1
—Clay Philbrook, Matinicus Island lobsterman

In the summer of 2009, an argument between two lobstermen in a small
Maine community culminated in a shooting.2 Predictably, the incident caused
serious injury to the victim and resulted in the arrest and indictment of the
gunman.3 Somewhat more unusually, it quickly spawned the filing of
numerous civil lawsuits.4 But one legal consequence was extraordinary. The
incident prompted the state of Maine to issue an order imposing a two-week
moratorium on lobster fishing in island waters—during the high point of the
lobster fishing season—effectively punishing not just the individuals involved,
but the entire community in which the shooting occurred.5
The notion that a community could or should be punished for an
individual’s misconduct will not resonate with most American-trained lawyers.
This concept appears at odds with some of the most basic tenets underlying the
American legal system, in which individual rights and responsibilities are some
of its most cherished core values.6 While the Western legal concept of
1 Shlomit Auciello, Matinicus Sees Lobster Subzone as Key to Survival, HERALD GAZETTE (Camden,
Me.), Aug. 20, 2009, http://knox.villagesoup.com/print/Print.cfm?StoryID=172845 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Members of the Philbrook family have resided on the Island since at least 1830. See DONNA K.
ROGERS, TALES OF MATINICUS ISLAND 17 (1990); Abby Goodnough, Seeking Salve for the Wound of an Ailing
Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2009, at A16 (noting that Philbrook’s ancestors “settled [on Matinicus Island]
in the 1820s”).
2 See generally Goodnough, supra note 1.
3 Jim Flannery, Lobster Wars: ‘Good People’ Doing Bad Things, SOUNDINGS (Sept. 22, 2009),
http://www.soundingsonline.com/component/content/article/241232/241232.
4 Id.
5 Id.; Nancy Harmon Jenkins, Maine Lobster Wars, ZESTER DAILY (Aug. 9, 2009, 3:53 PM),
http://www.zesterdaily.com/politics/106-maine-lobster-wars.html.
6 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (proposing that a strong, centralized republic best protects
individuals and the public against special interests of factions); AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE
KEEP 1 (1995) (“[T]he American legal system lacks any theory to handle groups. The dominant legal
paradigm in American law is the relationship between individual and state. The company we keep is
presumed to be each person’s own business, beyond the notice of the law.”); Michael Corrado, Is There an Act
Requirement in Criminal Law?, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1529 (1994) (“No one should be punished except for
something she does. . . . [S]he shouldn’t be punished for what someone else does . . . . Our conduct is what
justifies punishing us. One way of expressing this point is to say that there is a voluntary act requirement in
the criminal law.”); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 (1983) (“[O]nly
those who are guilty of wrongdoing should be punished . . . .”). But cf. U.S. CONST. amend. I (right of free
association). It is also at odds with basic tenets of the Judeo–Christian culture of which the U.S. legal system
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individual responsibility can be traced back to Biblical times (at least), the
uniquely American cultural ideal of rugged individualism, and its equally
robust emphasis on individual legal rights, is consistent with American
constitutional history and the Federalist distaste for local factions.7 The
Federalists deliberately created governments at the state and federal (but not
local) levels, and vested individuals with rights in the hopes that this design
would suppress local groups or factions that might threaten the Republic.8
Despite this history, the logic underlying the state of Maine’s response to
the shooting discussed above becomes understandable when considered in
context. The entire lobster fishing community of tiny Matinicus Island, where
the incident occurred, was involved in the lobstermen’s dispute.9 For weeks,
the two men had been arguing about whether the gunman’s son-in-law, a
mainlander, was entitled to trap lobsters on the ocean floor (or, in lobstermen’s
parlance, “piece of bottom”) underlying the waters surrounding Matinicus
Island.10
This argument was only the latest manifestation of the Islanders’ tradition
of insisting that Mainlanders are not welcome to set lobster traps on “their”
bottom.11 The lobstermen of Matinicus Island have routinely and customarily
insisted upon maintaining their traditional fishing boundaries against those
they consider outsiders.12 As a result, the territorial boundaries of the
is a part. See Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM. J.
INT’L L. 715, 763 n.272 (2008) (“One of the principal innovations of the Old Testament . . . is to introduce the
symmetry of its formulation for that of Hammurabi’s Code, a millennium earlier, which authorized the
punishment of an innocent person (the perpetrator’s son or daughter) for the action of the wrongdoer.”); see
also Deuteronomy 24:16 (“The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be
put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin.”); Devarim 24:16 (“Parents shall
not be put to death for children, nor children be put to death for parents: a man shall be put to death only for
his own crime.”).
7 See, e.g., CAROL M. ROSE, Ancient Constitution Versus Federalist Empire: Antifederalism from the
Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, in PROPERTY & PERSUASION 71, 73 (1994) (“[T]he mechanical
operation of the whole [constitutional] structure works to impede incursions on individual entitlements.”).
8 Id.
9 Goodnough, supra note 1. I will use the terms fisherman/men and lobsterman/men to refer to members
of both sexes, since both “[m]en and women [in the lobster industry] alike prefer to be called fishermen,
lobstermen, or ‘lobster catchers’ . . . .” JAMES M. ACHESON, CAPTURING THE COMMONS: DEVISING
INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE THE MAINE LOBSTER INDUSTRY 237 n.1 (2003).
10 Goodnough, supra note 1.
11 Id.
12 Flannery, supra note 3 (“The century-old practice of [Matinicus I]sland families claiming exclusive
lobstering rights to island waters is nowhere in Maine law, but it remains a fact of island life.”). As discussed
at length, infra notes 31–63 and accompanying text, lobster gangs have highly developed rules that members
must follow within each gang’s territories, as well as intergang rules and norms that result in the protection of
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Matinicus Island lobster bottom form the effective borders of the Matinicus
Island community, a subculture that defines itself by the work in which its
members engage beyond the Island’s dryland borders. Now, in the wake of
new regulations and other factors that threaten to erase the customary fishing
boundary that has defined the Island for more than a century, legal recognition
of the community’s right to prevent non-Island residents from catching lobsters
in waters surrounding the Island may be essential for its own survival.13
Indeed, within weeks of the shooting, the Islanders began lobbying for
legal recognition of a community-level property interest.14 The community
asked the state to carve out an area surrounding the Island for its residents’
exclusive fishing use, an initiative that an Island representative has labeled “a
community conservation” effort.15
More than a decade ago, Professor Carol Rose advocated for new ways of
conceiving community-level rights in property law terms.16 On her list of
potential candidates for such recognition were lobster fishing communities like
Matinicus Island.17 Rose identified lobster fishing communities based on their
ability to cooperate and successfully self-manage common pool resources
(CPRs),18 as documented in the works of a group of social scientists, led by
customary territorial boundaries. See generally JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 68
(1988).
13 Goodnough, supra note 1 (“[Matinicus lobstermen] want the state [of Maine] to carve out a restricted
zone where only full-time Matinicus residents can catch lobsters, an extraordinary step that the state is now
considering to preserve the local livelihood and the island itself. . . . The idea is to make sure that people who
are taking lobsters off this piece of bottom are living here on the island,’ said Clayton Philbrook . . . . ‘If we
lose control, we fold up and die—that’s it.’”); infra notes 113–15; see also infra notes 127–29, 134–36, and
accompanying text (discussing recent efforts by Matinicus Island lobstermen to establish a subzone in light of
the community’s economic need for such action in order to survive).
14 Auciello, supra note 1.
15 Id. (quoting Matinicus lobsterman Clay Philbrook).
16 Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 139–44 (1998); id. at 132 (“[W]e need to consider and refine our thinking
about still another and rather different category of property. This category is what I call the ‘limited common
property’ or LCP—property held as a commons among the members of a group, but exclusively vis-à-vis the
outside world.”). The related idea of how private ownership might be achieved (including, in the concept of
“private ownership,” the formal recognition of customary group ownership) is the broad subject of a more
recent article, which focuses on how various legal obstacles (such as antitrust issues arising from private
formalization of customary arrangements) might be overcome. See Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to
Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9 (2002).
17 Rose, supra note 16, at 140, 176–78 (arguing that limited common property rights should be
recognized in both the environmental and cyberspace contexts).
18 “Common pool resources” (CPRs) are any good—renewable or nonrenewable, including fish and
other wildlife, pastures, forests, light, wind, air—from which it is generally difficult to exclude others. See
ACHESON, supra note 9, at 9–10. The difficulty of excluding general (common) use is the primary
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Professor Elinor Ostrom, who was awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in
Economics based on this work.19
While Ostrom’s work draws conclusions about the feasibility of group
management based on case studies of groups or communities that are
successful resource managers, neither the CPR literature nor the legal literature
analyzes whether it may be normatively desirable to vest formal rights in these
groups to further encourage their behavior. Furthermore, while Professor Rose
noted the possibility that formal recognition of group-level property rights in
such groups might eventually emerge, she did not try to guess how or when
such a movement might occur in practice. But in the wake of the Matinicus
Islanders’ current effort to gain formal legal recognition of their traditional
fishing territory, the idea that such a movement might occur, and what form it
should take, is ripe for fulsome consideration and evaluation.
Because law typically evolves incrementally, a group-level right is most
likely to emerge as the logical extension of an analogous right that is already
well accepted. In fact, one form of group-level property rights has been
emerging in both international and domestic law over the past half-century.20
So-called cultural property rights vest groups with collective property rights in
objects and certain other property having unique cultural significance. This
form of group-level rights is now firmly embedded in U.S. law.
While, to date, cultural property rights have predominantly been viewed as
rights held by indigenous communities in cultural objects and a restricted class
of other property, such as burial grounds, I propose in this Article that such

characteristic of a CPR; by contrast, at the opposite extreme, “anticommons” may exist when multiple users
hold the right to exclude others, thus preventing efficient use of a resource by anyone. See Michael A. Heller,
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621,
622–23 (1998) (describing anticommons); Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 4–5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1743651 (describing how the parcel of property required for “utility-scale” renewable
fuel infrastructure, such as wind power, creates an anticommons problem because the parcel overlies multiple
jurisdictions, each with the right to exclude and stop the project).
19 Professor Ostrom was awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics “for her analysis of economic
governance, especially the commons.” Press Release, The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., The Prize in
Economic Sciences (Oct. 12, 2009), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/
press.pdf. Some of her most notable works include: ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) [hereinafter OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS]; ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (2005) [hereinafter OSTROM,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY]; ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES (1994).
20 LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 112 (2003) (“The courts have exhibited remarkable
receptiveness to public efforts to protect cultural property . . . .”).
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rights provide an excellent model for imagining how to design group-level
rights in communities (such as Matinicus Island) that sustainably manage
CPRs. While the Matinicus Island community has a long, unique history and
distinct subculture, it is not, as the term is generally understood,
“indigenous.”21 For that reason, this community may bridge the gap between
indigenous groups that have already been vested with some collective
community rights, and other managers of CPRs that might be logical
candidates for such property rights in the future.22
This Article demonstrates how such a legal right might be recognized. Part
I begins by laying out the history of the Matinicus Island lobstermen. This Part
relates the extensive history of the customary territorial system that has long
defined the Maine lobsterfishery and the conservation ethic that has become a
predominant cultural value in the industry, particularly among close-knit
groups like the Matinicus Island lobster fishing community.23 The Part then
describes legal regulation of the industry, including the new “comanagement”
system and licensing regime, which threatens the Matinicus Island community.
It also examines in some detail the recent efforts of Maine island communities,
including the current effort of Matinicus Islanders, to seek formal recognition
of their fishing territory boundaries.
Part II reviews the growing body of literature demonstrating the efficacy
and efficiency of small, close-knit groups. In particular, this Part discusses the
demonstrated ability of communities, including Maine lobster fishing
communities, to sustainably manage CPRs without legal intervention. The
academic literature suggests that fishermen from such communities are
21 “The term ‘indigenous peoples’ is usually used in reference to those individuals and groups who are
descendants of the original populations residing in a country. . . . [However, n]o single agreed-upon definition
of the term ‘indigenous peoples’ exists.” Robert K. Hitchcock, International Human Rights, the Environment,
and Indigenous Peoples, 5 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (1994).
22 Although I generally refer, as a shorthand concept, to the possibility of a legally recognized “property
right” in the traditional fishing bottom surrounding Matinicus Island (and in CPRs more generally), I do not
mean to suggest by that phrase that such recognition must include every stick in the traditional “bundle” of full
property rights. To the contrary, I generally mean the exclusive right to use this territory for lobster fishing
(and the right to exclude other lobstermen from using it for this purpose), but not, for example, the right to
alienate. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1529, 1531 (1989) (“If property law does develop like water law, it will increasingly exist as a collection of
use-rights, rights defined in specific contexts and in terms of similar rights held by other people.”).
23 A somewhat amorphous concept, a “close-knit group” has been defined as “a network in which power
is broadly distributed and information pertinent to informal control circulates easily among network members.
Typically, close-knit groups are made up of repeat players who can identify one another.” Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 359 (2003)
(footnote omitted).
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significantly more conservation oriented than their competitors. The Part ends
by examining arguments of potential corruptibility and disintegration of
community efficacy when formalization or “legalization” of community norms
occurs.
Part III then describes the field of cultural property rights. The Part
describes various legal regimes in both domestic and international law—
including specific international environmental initiatives seeking to protect and
harness the sustainable management practices of local communities. This Part
also examines the different ways that international treaties and domestic
statutes have recognized such rights, and places this movement in the context
of the historical recognition of certain group-level rights in the United States.
Part IV merges insights from the previous Parts to analyze claims for
formal legal recognition of exclusive rights in a CPR, such as the one currently
being advanced by Matinicus Islanders. The Part proposes a framework for
analyzing when such recognition is in the public interest and suggests several
alternatives for framing formal rights.
I. CASE STUDY: THE LOBSTERMEN OF MATINICUS ISLAND, MAINE
Matinicus Island sits more than twenty miles off the Maine coast, farther
offshore than any other Maine island community. The Island has no restaurant
or gas station, and residents generally fax their orders to a mainland grocery
store.24 In the winter, the ferry serves the Island only once a month.25 There
are only about fifty year-round residents on the Island and nearly all of them
are full-time lobstermen or in some way dependent on lobster fishing for their
livelihood. As in other Maine lobster fishing communities, most Matinicus
Islanders have “few if any other ways to make a living.”26 The strongly held
view of the Island’s residents—that the continuation of a year-round
community is entirely dependent on their continued ability to draw a livelihood
from the lobster industry—seems valid.27
24 Clarke Canfield, Lobstermen: Lobster Wars Rock Remote Maine Island, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB.
(Me.), Sept. 20, 2009, at D6.
25 Id.; see also Maine State Ferry Service: Matinicus Ferry, MAINEDOT, http://www.maine.gov/mdot/
msfs/matinicus.htm (last updated Jan. 27, 2011).
26 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 78.
27 Id. at 54; Flannery, supra note 3 (noting that half of the Island’s year-round residents are “serious
resident lobstermen”); id. (reporting opinion of Maine Marine Patrol Major John Fetterman that “[n]o one out
there [on Matinicus Island] can survive a closure [of the lobster fishery]” (internal quotation mark omitted));
Goodnough, supra note 1 (noting that the state of Maine “is now considering” taking the “extraordinary step”
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While unique in many ways,28 the Matinicus Island community is part of a
larger culture of lobster fishing that exists throughout coastal Maine. For more
than three decades, this lobster fishing culture of informal, extralegal norms29
has been extensively studied and documented by anthropologist and University
of Maine Professor James Acheson.30 These cultural norms exist sometimes
alongside and in tandem with, but also separate and apart from, the legal
regime that regulates the industry. The community of Matinicus Island can be
better understood as part of the complex culture from which it emanates.
A. Regulation of the Maine Lobster Industry
1. Extralegal Rules, Customs, and Informal Practices
Traditionally, Maine lobster fishermen have informally subjected
themselves to a system of customary territorial rules. These rules have
operated continuously for well over a century and have not significantly abated
despite the advent of increasing legal regulation and enforcement over the past
several decades.31 In theory, all one needs to do in order to go lobster fishing
off the coast of Maine is satisfy the requirements for a state license;32 in
of carving out a restricted fishing zone around Matinicus Island in order “to preserve the local livelihood and
the island itself”).
28 “Matinicus has been described as not just a place, but more ‘a way of life’ . . . .” ROGERS, supra note
1, at 12.
29 Throughout the Article, I use the term extralegal to refer to rules that are not formalized or codified in
legal instruments.
30 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 11–13 (describing his research). See generally id. at 1 (attempting to
answer the vexing question of what conditions lead “people [to] overexploit or conserve critical resources” by
“focusing on the Maine lobster industry,” which is “one of the most remarkably successful fisheries in the
world today”); ACHESON, supra note 12, at 1–2 (shattering the “stereotype of the Maine lobster
fisherman . . . as the last of the rugged individualists” by showing that “[s]urvival in the Maine lobster-fishing
industry depends on ties with fellow lobstermen, the ability to negotiate with lobster dealers, and the sharing of
certain skills”); James M. Acheson & Jennifer F. Brewer, Changes in the Territorial System of the Maine
Lobster Industry, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 37, 56 (Nives Dolšak & Elinor Ostrom eds.,
2003) (concluding that “[t]raditional lobstering territories in Maine are changing,” with areas of exclusive
fishing decreasing and areas of mixed fishing increasing). Every serious work about the lobster industry relies
on Professor Acheson’s works.
31 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 41–42 (citing Clans of Lobstermen Threaten Bloodshed, BRUNSWICK TIMES
RECORD (1907)).
32 To obtain a commercial lobster fishing license, one must enter “the apprentice program,” which
“consists of a minimum of 24 months, documenting 1,000 hours, 200 fishing days with up to three sponsors
AND apprentice/student fishermen must provide documentation of successful completion of a United States
Coast Guard approved Fishing Vessel Drill Conductor Course.” ME. DEP’T OF MARINE RES., MAINE LOBSTER
APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAM (2011) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.maine.gov/dmr/rm/lobster/
apprenticebrochure.pdf. Once the apprenticeship requirements are fulfilled, a prospective licensee is required
to “fill out a Zone Declaration Form to declare the lobster zone [he] wish[es] to fish the majority of [his]
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practice, a prospective lobster fisherman must jump through substantially more
hoops. Local customs and practices determine where lobstermen set traps, as
well as how many are set.33
A Maine lobsterman will almost certainly not succeed unless he is a
member of a “harbor gang.” Each harbor gang follows its own set of rules,
which may change from season to season as well as over time. These rules are
customary and widely, if not universally, observed, but for the most part they
have always been wholly extralegal—or, in some cases, were instituted
extralegally before being memorialized later in conservation laws.34
While all gangs inhabit informally demarcated territories, there are two
distinct types of territory.35 In the first type of territory—so-called nucleated
territory—the lobster gangs fish in certain exclusive pockets, usually near the
harbor mouth, but overlap the territories of other gangs farther from their home
base in nonexclusive areas.36 A perimeter-defended area, by contrast, is
exclusive to the gang that fishes it and is defined by distinct boundaries that do
not overlap any other gang’s territory. Perimeter-defended areas have become
less common and exist today only around some offshore islands (including

traps.” Id. If the chosen zone is “limited-entry,” the applicant will then “be placed on the waiting list for that
zone based on [his] eligibility date.” Id.
33 Some gangs also enforce stricter rules than those set by the state or federal government in other
respects as well. For example, some harbor gangs have established informal trap limits that are stricter than
those required by state law or regulation. See ACHESON, supra note 9, at 57. And, even before it was
mandatory, it was common practice for lobstermen to notch a V in breeding stock. See id. at 88–90.
34 Two examples of such conservation rules, adopted first by the lobstermen and later enacted into law by
the state legislature, are (1) V-notching the tails of egg-extruding females so that, when the eggs are not
visible, other lobstermen will still know they are breeders and throw them back, and (2) the adoption of lobster
trap vents. Id.
35 Professor Acheson uses the labels nucleated and perimeter-defended to describe these types, see id. at
29, and I will adopt his terms here too.
36 Id. On a map, nucleated territories appear to be a complicated Venn diagram, with each roughly
circular or oval territory containing parts that are exclusive to one gang and others overlapping one or more
gangs. See, e.g., id. at 52 (depicting a map of nucleated fishing areas of the mid-coast region of the
Muscongus Bay area).
Professor Acheson describes nucleated territories as providing their members with a strong “sense of
ownership” in the small area “close to the mouth of the home harbor,” which “grows progressively weaker the
further from the harbor one goes.” Id. at 29. By the time one is “[s]everal miles from shore, the sense of
territoriality is weak and a good deal of ‘mixed fishing’ takes place.” Id. In addition, “[n]ucleated areas have
far larger territories, and the gangs controlling them have more fishermen than those in perimeter-defended
areas,” which in turn affects and is affected by the social organization of the gangs who fish these different
types of territories. Id. “People in perimeter-defended areas interact a good deal and know each other very
well. . . . In nucleated areas, there is far less interaction.” Id.
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Matinicus).37 These few remaining perimeter-defended territories encompass a
substantially smaller physical area than they did just twenty years ago.38
The diminishing number and size of perimeter-defended territories is
attributable in part to increasing encroachment by rival gangs, a practice that
has intensified as the total number of lobstermen competing for lobsters has
grown. While encroachment has always occurred—with boundary lines
shifting over time—the likelihood of successful territorial defense has lessened
in recent years.39 Traditionally, if warnings did not suffice to dissuade
invading gangs from encroaching, lobster gangs’ primary means of defending
their informal territories was to illegally cut trap lines on traps set by
infiltrating members of rival gangs.40 In recent years, however, increased law
enforcement measures targeting trap cutting has had a significant deterrent
impact.41 The steep fines and potential to lose one’s license—and with it, in
many cases, one’s sole source of income—have combined to substantially
deter lobstermen from defending their traditional territories.42
No one is quite sure exactly how the territorial system originated. Most
likely it was the result of usufructuary rights developing over time as
individual owners of waterfront properties fished in adjacent waters and
gradually developed a sense of ownership.43 These individual “titles” may
have eventually evolved into a system of de facto collective ownership of the
fishing territory by all the owners of property on a single island or near a
harbor.44 No record exists to show precisely when this development occurred,
37 Id.; see also ACHESON, supra note 12, at 79 (“Perimeter-defended areas exist only in the fishing waters
surrounding Green Island, Matinicus, Metinic, Monhegan and some of the smaller islands in the Muscle Ridge
channel.”).
38 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 51–56 (describing territorial changes over time).
39 Acheson & Brewer, supra note 30, at 56–57.
40 Id. at 41–42.
41 Id. at 47–48.
42 Id.; ACHESON, supra note 9, at 223 (noting that, in recent years, “fear of losing one’s license [has]
dissuaded many fishermen from indulging in a lot of trap cutting”). The potential loss of license has had a
significant impact despite the relative unlikelihood of being caught by the Marine Patrol, which is broadly
dispersed across a large area. See James M. Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs Revisited: Economic and Ecological
Effects of Territoriality in Maine Lobster Fishing, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS 37, 39 (Bonnie J.
McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (“[O]nly thirty-seven state Sea and Shore Fisheries wardens patrol
some 2,500 miles of coast . . . .”).
43 Acheson, supra note 42, at 41; see also Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in
U.S. Fisheries: Contracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813, 820 (1997) (“A usufruct is a right to
use and enjoy the profits and advantages of something belonging to another.”).
44 Today, it is more complicated than this, with lobster gang membership correlated to, but not
necessarily dependent upon, a connection to the ownership of nearby real property, or at least a strong
connection to the local community. See ACHESON, supra note 9, at 30–31. The correlation is weaker than it
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but even a century ago, a local newspaper was reporting that “the Monhegan
fishermen have always looked upon lobster fishing around the island as their
exclusive right.”45
While the origin of the system of informal rules is murky, the effects are
clear. “Many of the rules devised for the lobster industry [effectively] give
fishermen property rights over the resource (such as territorial rules), and thus
motivate fishermen to conserve.”46 This conservation ethic does not correlate
with any formal legal initiative. While conservation laws have been on the
books in Maine since the nineteenth century, they were basically ignored until
after World War II.47 Furthermore, after 1934, very few formal legal
initiatives occurred until federal involvement in marine resource conservation
spurred new regulation at various levels beginning in the 1970s.48 Yet, during
this same time period, the culture changed and “a marked conservation ethic”
developed.49 “By the 1990s, the lobster conservation laws became almost selfenforcing.”50 This shift has been attributed to a change in attitude among the
lobstermen themselves.51
This marked change in attitude among post-World War II lobstermen likely
derived first from the lobstermen’s economic desire to avoid another “bust”
like one they had experienced during the Great Depression, when the lobster
catch dropped precipitously.52 As the catch continued to increase over time,
the lobstermen attributed this increase to informal conservation rules they had
used to be: “Over the course of the past half century, it has become easier to enter harbor gangs of nucleated
areas. Many people have entered the industry who are not from lobster fishing families, and a lot of people
‘from away’ have succeeded in becoming lobster fishermen.” See id. at 31.
45 Id. at 42 (quoting Clans of Lobstermen Threaten Bloodshed, supra note 31) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
46 Id. at 6; see also infra Part IV (discussing more generally the empirical support for conservation
incentives among groups with a strong sense of community).
47 Professor Acheson recounts how utter disrespect for the conservation laws permeated the industry
during the early part of the twentieth century. See ACHESON, supra note 9, at 81. The attitude was so
prevalent that illegal, undersized lobsters were served at a dinner party held by a state commissioner charged
with the management of marine resources (including enforcement of the size laws). Id. Once, in a desperate,
unsuccessful effort to change this attitude, a Maine Commissioner of Sea and Shore Fisheries closed down the
fishery, hoping to send a message to the citizenry, who were, in the Commissioner’s view, overwhelmingly “in
favor of the illegal traffic in lobsters.” Id. (quoting Letter from Horatio Crie, Comm’r, Sea & Shore Fisheries
to Walter Donnell (Mar. 19, 1932), reprinted in CORRESPONDENCE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SEA AND SHORE
FISHERIES 1930–1934 (Me. State Archives, Augusta, Maine)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
48 See infra notes 84–91 and accompanying text.
49 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 81.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 162–64.
52 Id. at 219.
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simultaneously adopted, further solidifying the importance of these informal
rules in their culture.53 Notably, the traditional boundary system, with its
informal group monitoring, became deeply entrenched and flourished during
the same time period in which a conservation ethic steadily took hold and
increased rapidly.54
Because the informal rules that govern lobster gangs lack legal grounding,
they are subject to being undermined or overcome by laws or regulations. For
example, enforcement by marine patrol of legal prohibitions on trap line
cutting has dramatically decreased lobstermen’s incentives to defend their
informal boundaries.55 The impact is so significant that “the entire territorial
system is changing and may go out of existence” as a result of stepped-up law
enforcement.56
This threat to the territorial system is to the detriment of lobster
conservation efforts. Though perimeter-defended areas have gotten smaller,
and disappeared entirely in fishing areas off the mainland, they provide an
ideal environment for the development of effective social controls over group
member behavior.57 Lobstermen in these communities have “few if any other
ways to make a living on these islands.”58 Accordingly, they have always been
and continue to be highly motivated “to preserve these resources for
themselves” in order “to make a living, and for future generations, if the
community [is] to survive.”59 It may be that “these factors [have] played a

53

Id.
See id. at 222 (contrasting changes in extralegal enforcement of territorial boundaries over the last
twenty years with the ease of enforcing boundaries during “most of the past one hundred years”). This culture
of conservation extends beyond compliance with existing laws. See id. at 88–90 (describing the voluntary
effort of lobstermen to cut notches on egged lobsters before it was legally required).
55 Id. at 222.
56 Id.
57 As will be discussed in Part II, a substantial body of economic and political science literature is
devoted to the study of close-knit groups and their ability to develop informal rules to manage CPRs. Some
subgroups that make up the informal territorial culture that binds together Maine lobstermen as a subculture
better exemplify this than others. In nucleated areas, monitoring is difficult because groups are both widely
dispersed and overlapping. Id. at 74. Perimeter-defended areas, by contrast, are smaller and tend to be
confined to members of isolated—mostly island—communities that are close-knit, with extensive kinship and
social ties that extend beyond the fishery and into the daily lives of the lobster gang members and their
families. See id. at 78 (discussing the example of Monhegan, which has a “strong sense of community” and
“where intense interaction aids in developing common goals and values”).
58 Id.
59 Id.; accord Auciello, supra note 1 (“This isn’t for what we [current lobstermen] can put in our
pockets . . . . It’s for our grandchildren to have something to put in their pockets.” (quoting Matinicus Island
lobsterman Clay Philbrook) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
54
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strong [role] in motivating the establishment of territories and limited-entry
rules.”60
Even after informal rules and norms develop, maintaining them—and
thereby maintaining the territories to which they apply— is difficult because it
requires collective action.61 While certain lobster gangs have been highly
successful in overcoming this obstacle, most have not. Those that have
succeeded have done so in large part because they are affiliated with close-knit
communities, whose small size encourages close interaction and monitoring,
making them particularly hospitable to coordination and cooperation.62
However, whether even these communities can survive the combined impact of
the recent legal and technological changes that impact the Maine lobster
fishery remains to be seen.63
2. Formal Legal Regulation
a. Statutory Regulation: 1870s–1980s
While lobsters were caught and consumed locally before the middle of the
nineteenth century, there was no commercial lobster industry in Maine before
1840.64 Once it emerged, the commercial lobster industry grew quickly with
60 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 78; see also id. at 221–24 (discussing the virtual overlap between a
conservation ethic and a low discount rate, which both represent a “willingness to sacrifice present gains for
future rewards”).
61 Social scientists agree that collective action dilemmas are exceedingly difficult obstacles to overcome.
Such “dilemmas have received an enormous amount of attention from social scientists, primarily because they
describe so many of the most vexing problems plaguing humanity.” Id. at 8. It has been said that politics
itself is a “study of ways of solving collective action problems.” Michael Taylor, Cooperation and
Rationality: Notes on the Collective Action Problem and Its Solutions, in THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 222,
224 (Karen Schweers Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990).
62 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 78–79, 143 (“A strong sense of community appears to play a key role in
maintaining rules once they are in place.”).
63 Acheson & Brewer, supra note 30, at 56 (concluding that the combination of “trap escalation,”
“bigger, better equipped boats,” the passage of “a zone management law,” and stricter “enforcement of laws
prohibiting gear molestation” have all combined to “alter[] the cost-benefit ratio of defending traditional
boundaries, with the result that the amount of territory held exclusively by harbor gangs has decreased, and the
number of areas where mixed fishing takes place has increased”). The demise of small lobster fishing
communities may be hastened by the recent downward trend of lobster prices, combined with generally poor
economic conditions. See Goodnough, supra note 1.
64 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 82. Some of these communities were in existence well before the lobster
industry. For example, one local account states that the population of Matinicus Island in 1810 was roughly
double what it is today and that, by 1835, the Island had 192 residents—almost four times its current
population. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 16–17. “In 1870 the population of Matinicus reached its peak at two
hundred seventy six. After that there would be a steady decline.” Id. at 17.
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two disparate and competing subindustries developing—the lobster canning
business and the live-lobster market. The canning industry preferred to
purchase smaller lobsters, which were available at a lower price per pound.65
The live-lobster industry had a competing interest in protecting lobsters until
they grew large enough to sell to restaurants for individual meals.66
When the lobster catch began to decline sharply in the 1860s, the
competition between these two subindustries intensified, and each began
lobbying for conservation laws primarily aimed at benefitting itself and
harming its competitor.67 The first law, passed in 1872, forbade the capture of
egg-bearing females.68 Two years later, the Maine legislature passed another
law, the first to limit the size of lobsters that could be captured, making it
illegal to take very small lobsters from October to April.69 These first laws
impacted only the live-lobster industry, not the canneries.70 Even so, the livelobster industry soon grew in size and strength and, by the end of the century,
had developed a strong lobby that helped to achieve the passage of several
additional laws.71
Some of these statutes directly targeted cannery
operations—for example, making it illegal to can lobsters from August through
April—while others increased restrictions on capturing both breeding and
younger lobsters.72 As their sponsors had hoped, these laws eventually drove
the canneries out of business.73
Despite the existence of conservation laws and the absence of any
competition from the canning industry, the Maine lobster catch continued to
65

ACHESON, supra note 9, at 82.
Id. at 82–83.
67 Id. at 83. These were “conservation” laws in name only, at least insofar as the lobbying industries
behind them were concerned. The real motivation behind legislation regulating what size lobsters could
legally be taken was not conservation; the point was to harm the competing industry. Id. at 82–83.
68 An Act to Protect the Spawn or Egg Lobsters in the Waters of Maine, ch. 20, § 1, 1872 Me. Laws 14,
14.
69 An Act for the Better Protection of Lobsters in the Waters of Maine, ch. 210, § 1, 1874 Me. Laws 146,
146–47 (less than 10.5 inches).
70 Laws protecting large breeding females did not affect an industry that preferred smaller, cheaper
lobsters, while the restriction against taking lobsters during the winter months simply shifted the cannery
operations to months when the average price of lobster was lower anyway. See ACHESON, supra note 9, at 82–
83.
71 Id. at 84.
72 E.g., An Act for the Protection of Lobsters, ch. 96, §§ 1–2, 1879 Me. Laws 114, 114; An Act for the
Protection of Lobsters, ch. 138, § 2, 1883 Me. Laws 115, 115–16.
73 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 84. All New England lobster canneries had closed before the turn of the
century. See id. (“These laws made canning so unprofitable that the canneries began to close. . . . In 1895, the
legislature passed a law . . . [that] apparently forced the last of the canneries from the state.” (citation
omitted)).
66
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decline over the next several decades.74 In response, more laws were passed.
In 1917, the Maine legislature enacted a law providing that the state would pay
market prices to purchase any egg-bearing lobsters in the possession of lobster
wholesalers.75 State officers would then punch holes in these lobsters’ tails
and release them.76 Lobstermen were prohibited from catching and keeping
any “punched” lobsters.77
Another legislative effort aimed at restoring the declining lobster
population was the passage of the so-called double-gauge law.78 The first
double-gauge law was enacted in 1934 and imposed a maximum size limit in
addition to the already-existing minimum.79 By permitting lobstermen to take
only medium-sized lobsters, double-gauge laws encourage and allow
lobstermen to catch lobsters that are an optimal size from a market perspective,
but simultaneously protect very young lobsters as well as the older breeding
stock that produce the majority of eggs.80
Between the 1930s and the 1970s, few additional legal regulations were
enacted. The most significant exception was the 1947 amendment to the 1917

74 Id. at 80, 84. As discussed, supra note 47 and accompanying text, these laws were essentially without
effect when they were first enacted; they were ignored by nearly all lobstermen whose widespread refusal to
abide by them made enforcement impossible.
75 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 89 (citing An Act to Amend Section Thirty-Six of Chapter Forty-Five of
the Revised Statutes, Relating to the Purchase, Marking and Liberating of Seed Lobsters, ch. 255, 1917 Me.
Laws 285). Technically, wholesalers were already forbidden from selling such lobsters, and to the extent they
were complying with this rule and putting these lobsters back in the ocean, the new law should not have been
necessary. In addition to providing economic incentives to wholesalers, the law had the added benefit of
marking breeding stock as such even when they were not extruding eggs. The statute was apparently very
successful, with the state of Maine purchasing “60,000 pounds of seed lobster, from the fishermen through
dealers, at market prices.” Id. (quoting 1936 NINTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE DEP’T OF SEA AND SHORE
FISHERIES OF THE STATE OF MAINE 11) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76 Id.
77 Id. (citing 1917 Me. Laws 285).
78 The double-gauge law is still in effect albeit in slightly different form than when originally enacted.
See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 6431 (2005 & Supp. 2010).
79 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 88 (citing Alfred Eldon, Double Gauge Law Passed, ATLANTIC
FISHERMAN, Jan. 7, 1933, at 7); see also id. (citing An Act Relating to Measurement of Lobsters, ch. 176, 1935
Me. Laws 388) (double-gauge law passed in 1935). Initial lobbying for a double-gauge law began almost
twenty years before its eventual enactment. See id. at 86–88 (lobbying for double-gauge law began in or
around 1915).
80 The breeding potential of a female lobster increases dramatically with size. “A female measuring 3¼
inches on the carapace might be able to extrude five hundred eggs; one 5 inches on the carapace can extrude
one hundred thousand at once. Moreover, large lobsters can extrude eggs twice on a single molt or
copulation.” Id. at 196.
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law.81 This amendment prescribed that a “V-shaped” notch be carved into the
tail of any egg-bearing female, replacing the punched hole that had been the
norm for thirty years.82 To help with enforcement, this amendment also
permitted the sale of such lobsters to state officials only by individuals with
special licenses.83
In the 1970s, a type of lobster trap that contained a vent designed to allow
undersized lobsters to escape was invented.84 It was soon proposed that the
use of this trap design be legally mandated.85 The proposed law enjoyed broad
support among scientists—and also among lobstermen, who quickly realized
that using an escape vent would save them a substantial amount of work
ridding traps of undersized lobsters and, at the same time, would increase their
catch by making room for a greater number of legal-sized lobsters in each
trap.86 Many lobstermen began voluntarily using escape vents in their traps
before the escape-vent law was enacted in 1978.87
More intensive regulation occurred in the 1970s and 1980s following the
involvement and interest of the federal government in marine fisheries. Before

81 As discussed above, the V-notch law was informally expanded during the same post-World War II
period when lobstermen independently decided to enhance the effectiveness of the program by voluntarily
cutting notches on egged lobsters. Id. at 89–90 (describing the increasing popularity among lobstermen to
undertake this voluntary effort and noting that this practice is “one of those cases, perhaps rare, where a formal
law [has] turned into an informal norm”).
82 An Act to Revise the Sea and Shore Fisheries Laws, ch. 332, § 123, 1947 Me. Laws 404, 408.
83 Id. In addition to the above legislation, which exists in some form to this day, see ME. REV. STAT. tit.
12, § 6436(1) (2005), the only other major legislative enactments during this period were the “seasonal laws,”
restricting lobster fishing in many areas during the summer months. ACHESON, supra note 9, at 84. Most of
these were eventually repealed, perhaps because technology improved to allow summer fishing without an
extremely high mortality rate for the catch. See id. at 85. The only one that continues to this day is the
seasonal restriction on lobster fishing off Monhegan Island. Id. By state law, lobster fishing is not permitted
in the waters within two miles of the island except between the months of December and June. This law has
been in effect for more than a century. See id. at 84 (citing An Act to Better Protect the Lobster Industry
Within Two Miles from the Shore of Monhegan Island Between the First Day of June and the Twenty-Fifth
Day of November of Each Year, ch. 61, 1907 Me. Laws 273). This law allows the lobstermen of Monhegan
Island to focus only on fishing during the winter months and only on the highly profitable tourist industry
during the summer months (and without worrying about competitors taking lobsters from their territory). See
id. at 84–85.
84 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 90.
85 Id. at 91.
86 Id. at 90–91.
87 See id. (citing An Act to Allow Escape of Sublegal Lobsters from Lobster or Crab Traps, ch. 385, 1977
Me. Laws 528). The escape vent law has been modified slightly over the years but has generally retained very
broad support throughout the industry and the scientific community. See id. at 91.
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the 1970s, there was no federal regulation of the lobster fishery.88 This
changed only after states lobbied the federal government to take action to
protect the fisheries from international vessels that had begun to arrive in the
waters off of New England in increasing numbers by the 1960s and 1970s, and
which had “severely damag[ed] stocks of fish in international waters that had
been historically fished by the American fleet.”89 The result was the passage
of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976,90 which gave the
federal government “the power to regulate all fishing within 200 miles of the
United States—including the domestic industry.”91
b. Comanagement and Other Legal Regulation: 1990s to the Present
From the point of view of the lobster industry, the involvement of the
federal government has been generally unwelcome.92 Control has shifted back
and forth between federal and regional entities since the 1970s.93 Many of the
current state-law and regional initiatives are concerted efforts to ward off more
intrusive federal intervention.94
The major effort in this respect is Maine’s “comanagement” or “zone
licensing” system, arguably the most radical and significant shift in the
regulation of the lobster industry.95 The zone system was established by
legislation in 1995 after years of lobbying and debate.96 The main features of
this system are: (1) demarcated fishing zones, each of which may be primarily
fished only by lobstermen with a license for that zone; (2) eligibility criteria to
88 See id. at 166 (“From the founding of the Republic to the 1970s, fisheries management was completely
in the hands of the states.”).
89 See id. at 167.
90 Id. at 166.
91 Id. at 167.
92 See generally id. at 188–91 (describing significant rule changes agreed upon by the lobster industry in
an effort to ward off more extensive federal regulation in response to lawsuits brought by environmental
activists under the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act to prevent endangered
whales from being injured or killed from entanglements in lobster gear).
93 Id. at 167.
94 See id. at 166, 191.
95 Id. at 97.
96 Id. at 99. While the zone system was entirely new as a legal matter in 1995, a limited entry system has
been the de facto norm for more than a century, as discussed below in Part I.A.3. Thus, while “[t]he idea of
limited entry came as no shock or surprise, for the industry ha[d] been limiting entry to harbor gangs
informally for many decades,” the lobstermen’s “interest focused on who would be allowed to go fishing and
who would not. It quickly became apparent that fishermen wanted to exclude those who had traditionally been
excluded and include those who had always been granted admission.” ACHESON, supra note 12, at 134. As a
result of concerns regarding establishing criteria for granting licenses that would preserve the status quo,
legislative attempts to regulate lobster fishing were stymied for years. See id. at 134–35.
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qualify for a commercial license; (3) an apprenticeship program for all new
entrants to lobster fishing; (4) trap limits of no more than 1,200 traps per
license holder; and (5) a trap-tag system to identify owners of individual
traps.97
The most significant feature of this comanagement system is the structure
established for its governance. As a “bottom-up” system, comanagement aims
to vest a great deal of control and governance in the hands of the lobstermen
themselves.98 Each zone has an elected council composed of zone license
holders.99 The councils are empowered to propose rules specific to their
respective zones.100 A rule proposed by the zone council is then submitted to a
vote of all license holders within the zone.101 If two-thirds of the license
holders agree that the rule should be enacted, the council conveys the result to
the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Marine Resources who, so long
as the rule is “reasonable,” is required to formalize the rule as a departmental
regulation that will be enforced by the Marine Patrol.102
Most of the zones have taken advantage of the comanagement aspect of the
law and enacted zone-level rules. For instance, within a few years, most zones
had passed more restrictive trap limits than the statewide maximum, and many
had imposed limited-entry rules.103 Many of the rules that have been passed
are tailored to each zone’s “culture.” For example, in the rural, sparsely
populated northeast coast, near the Canadian border, the lobstermen object

97 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 6421–6431 (2005 & Supp. 2010). Implementation of the zone management
law is primarily left to the discretion of the Commissioner of the Department of Marine Resources, who is
generally vested with primary regulatory authority over the lobster fishery. See ACHESON, supra note 9, at
101–02. Even the number of zones is not set by statute. Id. at 102. Instead, the number was established
following a study by the implementation committee and input from various factions. Id. In 1998, a special
taskforce was formed to study the possible creation of subzones and ultimately made a recommendation
discouraging them. Id. at 50–51.
98 Comanagement systems are so called because they envision cooperative management between the
manager (e.g., the state) and the entity being managed (in this instance, the lobster industry).
99 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 97.
100 Id. (noting that the 1995 passage of the zone management law empowered the councils to propose the
first three rules, while a 1999 amendment further allowed the zone councils to make proposals with respect to
the fourth).
101 Specifically, the council can propose four different kinds of rules: (1) a more stringent trap limit, lower
than the statewide maximum of 1,200 per license holder; (2) a limit on the number of traps that may be fished
on a single line; (3) the times of day that lobster fishing is to be permitted within the zone; and (4) a limit on
the number of fishermen that may be admitted as license holders in the zone as older license holders retire. Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 101.
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strongly to limited-entry rules, while the denser population on the southern
coast feels that limited entry is essential.104
The zone system, along with its comanagement aspects, is generally
considered to be successful.105 Yet, it has had some unintended results.
Defying both the intended and expected outcomes, the number of traps being
fished actually increased following the imposition of trap limits.106 While
formal trap limits forced a few individuals to reduce the number they were
using, many who had already been fishing fewer traps responded to the legal
limit by increasing their trap numbers.107
Perhaps the biggest potentially negative consequence of the zone system is
that it is apparently playing a role in the unraveling of the informal culture that
has, for so long, defined the Maine lobster fishery and the communities that
depend on it.108 To be sure, the zone management law may have staved off
more intensive federal regulation, which in turn could have had a more
dramatic and immediate negative impact. Yet, the comanagement aspect of the
zone management system vests formal management in the hands of different
groups of lobstermen who work in the same geographic area.109 While these
individuals have much in common, each of the six zones is composed of
numerous groups from different harbor gangs that have not traditionally
worked together.110 Many of these individuals are direct rivals who are
suddenly expected to cooperate.111
B. Matinicus Island, Maine: The Community, the Shooting, and the Aftermath
While the advent of comanagement may have warded off more intensive
regulation by the federal government, it has helped to discourage the
104 Several lobstermen from the northern coast noted in interviews that “if the youngsters cannot go
fishing, they will have no choice but to move away and the communities, already struggling to maintain their
populations, will die.” Id. at 111. Professor Acheson notes that this “is one of the most common objections to
limited entry in general.” Id.
105 See, e.g., id. at 232.
106 See id. at 126–32.
107 See id. It has been theorized that the reason for this reaction was a widespread fear among lobstermen
that the law might one day be amended and subject them to lower limits based on their actual usage. Id. at 129
(“Many fishermen predicted that the trap-tag information would be used to limit or freeze the number of traps
a person could fish.”).
108 Acheson & Brewer, supra note 30, at 39 (“Recent legislation, especially a new zone management law,
is causing (along with other factors) profound changes in the territorial system.” (footnote omitted)).
109 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 101–03, 104 (depicting zones on map).
110 Id. at 124.
111 Id.
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traditional boundary system. The creation of zones in which legal fishing is
permitted outside of traditional group boundaries encourages boundary
dissolution and increased mixed fishing.
In general, the number of perimeter-defended territories has decreased
markedly, and the few remaining may be on the verge of extinction.112 One of
these is Matinicus Island, the very archetype of a small, close-knit community.
Located farther from the mainland than any other Maine community,
Matinicus Islanders are virtually cut off from face-to-face contact with
outsiders for much of the year.113 The continued existence of this small
community of approximately fifty year-round residents depends upon its
residents’ ability to work together and extract a living from the lobster
fishery.114
Like every other lobster gang, the Matinicus Island gang has its own set of
informal norms and unwritten rules. For well over a century, one firmly
embedded rule has required all Matinicus lobstermen to live on the Island.115
Whether someone has established the requisite “resident” status can be
complicated.116 For example, lobsterman Alan Miller owns property on
Matinicus Island with his wife, who grew up there.117 His father-in-law is a
year-round resident and lobsterman.118 But Miller also maintains a very
successful mainland business, as well as a mainland residence, and some
Matinicus lobstermen do not accept that he has satisfied the informal residence
requirement. As a result, many Islanders do not accept that Miller has a
“right” to fish inside their perimeter-defended border, despite the fact that he
holds a Zone C license, which gives him the legal right to go lobster fishing
throughout midcoast Maine, including in the waters surrounding Matinicus
Island.119

112 Id. at 55 (“The future of the perimeter-defended islands is a matter of some debate. Some think the
perimeter-defended areas are essentially undefendable now. . . . There are many in Maine who believe that we
are witnessing a fundamental change in the traditional territorial system.”). See generally id. at 40–55.
113 Canfield, supra note 24; see also Maine State Ferry Service: Matinicus Ferry, supra note 25.
114 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
115 Flannery, supra note 3 (quoting Professor Acheson).
116 The degree of selectivity, including strict entry rules, may bolster a community member’s identity as
such. In the constitutional context, associational rights are at their apex when, among other things, there exists
“a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
117 Flannery, supra note 3.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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In 2009, an escalating feud over Miller’s “right” to fish Matinicus
territory—with Miller and his in-laws on one side and other lobstermen on the
other—escalated well beyond a typical boundary dispute.120 In late July, after
days of rising tension and escalating threats, lobsterman Chris Young was shot
in the neck by Miller’s father-in-law, Vance Bunker.121 The shooting occurred
in front of a marine patrol officer who was arriving on Miller’s boat to
investigate a report that Young had threatened Miller earlier in the day.122
Criminal charges were filed against Bunker following the incident, and in
connection with the criminal case, Bunker was ordered to stay off the Island.123
Young remained hospitalized several weeks later when he filed a civil lawsuit
against Bunker.124

120 Id. (quoting Maine Marine Patrol Major John Fetterman, who notes that, while feuds like the one
underlying the shooting are nothing new, “in the 30 years that I’ve been around, this is the first time it has
escalated to this level of violence” (internal quotation mark omitted)). The violent culmination of the feud in
2009 comes less than a year after another feud over fishing rights within the Matinicus territory found its way
to the Maine legal system. Id. In September 2008, Victor Ames sued the Department of Marine Resources
and twenty-three Matinicus lobstermen for colluding to keep him from exercising his right to trap lobsters off
Matinicus Island. Id. Ames, a lifelong Matinicus resident, alleged that he had hired a mainlander to tend his
traps while he was recuperating on the mainland following heart surgery. Id. Ames claimed that these
lobstermen surrounded his employee and threatened to destroy his gear if he came into the Matinicus territory
again. Id.
121 Canfield, supra note 24; Flannery, supra note 3; Goodnough, supra note 1. Several of the individuals
involved in the argument on the wharf were armed, including Miller’s wife and Young’s half-brother Weston
Ames. Flannery, supra note 3. Earlier in the day, Bunker had reportedly used pepper spray to fend off Young.
Id. All of these individuals are from families who have resided on Matinicus Island for generations. See
ROGERS, supra note 1, at 17 (recounting that members of the Ames family, along with Philbrooks and Youngs,
had been on the Island since the nineteenth century but that, by 1950, other old names had been replaced with
new ones, including Bunker).
122 Canfield, supra note 24; Flannery, supra note 3; Goodnough, supra note 1. The shooting of Young is
part of a history that includes other violent interactions between rival gangs. Lobster gangs have been
threatening bloodshed for more than a century, as evidenced by newspaper reports dating back to 1907.
ACHESON, supra note 9, at 41–42 (citing Clans of Lobstermen Threaten Bloodshed, supra note 31); Canfield,
supra note 24 (“[O]nce, in Portland Harbor, a crew rammed its boat into another vessel, jumped aboard and
struggled with the other crew before being tossed overboard.”). Indeed, the shooting is only one of several
particularly serious and violent criminal acts perpetrated against lobstermen during the summer of 2009.
Clarke Canfield, Lobster Boats Sunk After Harbor Shooting, SEACOAST ONLINE (Aug. 6, 2009, 2:00 AM),
http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20090806-NEWS-908060405.
123 Bunker was charged with elevated aggravated assault, released on a $125,000 bond, and ordered to
stay off the island. Flannery, supra note 3. Ultimately, Bunker (and his daughter) were acquitted by a
mainland jury after claiming that “he fired only because he feared for his daughter’s life after Ames grabbed
the barrel of the shotgun she was holding.” Clarke Canfield, Maine Lobster Wars Continue a Year After
Shooting, TELEGRAPH (Nashua, N.H.), July 21, 2010, http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/news/statenewengland/
800767-227/maine-lobster-wars-continue-a-year-after.html.
124 The lawsuit sought $4 million in damages for neurological injuries that allegedly could jeopardize
Young’s future ability to work. Flannery, supra note 3. On May 4, 2011, it was reported that the parties had
settled. See Heather Steeves, Matinicus Fishermen Resolve Civil Suit in 2009 Shooting, BANGOR DAILY NEWS
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Just as the feud that led to the shooting involved the entire community and
its informal lobster fishing rules, the entire lobster fishing community—and
not just the individuals involved—were sanctioned as a result of the violence.
In response to the shooting, the Commissioner of the Department of Marine
Resources, in an exercise of his regulatory authority over the Maine lobster
fishery, closed the area around Matinicus Island for two weeks, thereby
effectively suspending the licenses of the entire community for part of the very
busy July harvest season.125 After only four days, the State agreed to lift the
ban to settle a lawsuit brought by the Islanders seeking to enjoin enforcement
of the order.126
In early August, Matinicus lobstermen met as a group to discuss the
overriding problems they faced as a community with no legal right to enforce
the perimeter boundary they had always treated as their own.127 This meeting
resulted in a proposal, submitted to the Department of Marine Resources, to
designate a special subzone for their Island.128 The proposed subzone would
track the informal, perimeter-defended area that has existed for decades and
that, by longstanding custom, may only be fished by year-round residents of
the Island.129
The idea of creating a subzone of this type is not without precedent. Twice
before, the state has established subzones, formalizing traditional boundaries
around two other islands, Monhegan Island and Swan’s Island.130 However,
following contentious lobbying against the Monhegan Island subzone, the
legislature appointed a special committee to study the issue.131 This committee
(May 4, 2011, 1:03 PM), http://new.bangordailynews.com/2011/05/04/news/midcoast/matinicus-fishermenresolve-civil-suit-in-2009-shooting. The settlement terms were not disclosed. See id.
125 Flannery, supra note 3. The closing led to a legal challenge by the lobstermen seeking an injunction
against the State. The lawsuit was quickly settled, with the State agreeing to lift the order and permit fishing
again after only a four-day closure. Id.
126 Id.
127 Auciello, supra note 1; Canfield, supra note 24.
128 Goodnough, supra note 1.
129 Auciello, supra note 1; Goodnough, supra note 1.
130 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 50–51. For example, the Monhegan subzone law provides that “only
fishermen who have passed a special apprenticeship program on Monhegan can obtain a commercial lobster
license to fish in the island’s waters.” Id. at 61. The apprenticeship program requires “aspiring fishermen” to
“spend 150 days on a Monhegan boat.” Id. Even if they “pass the apprenticeship program, they cannot go
fishing in Monhegan waters until one of the fishermen on the island ceases to fish.” Id. The Swan’s Island
subzone, by contrast, was created in 1985 after going “through a DMR rule making process.” Auciello, supra
note 1. While “all licensed lobstermen . . . are eligible to select Swan’s Island as their primary area, . . . in
doing so they limit themselves to 475 traps no matter where they choose to set them.” Id.
131 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 51.
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recommended that no further subzones be created, “reflect[ing] the wishes of
the majority of fishermen from mainland harbors, a group that for the past
forty years had been expanding the amount of area in which the members
placed traps.”132
Even if the committee’s recommendation could be overcome, Matinicus
Islanders might still face an uphill battle. The two existing subzones were
proposed and granted not as community-level initiatives per se, but as special
resource-conservation zones subject to more restrictive rules than those in
place throughout the rest of Maine.133 Unlike these subzones, the one
proposed by Matinicus Islanders is not explicitly advocated as a resourceconservation initiative; instead, Matinicus Island is asking the state of Maine to
create this subzone as a “community conservation” measure.134 Because the
Island community depends almost exclusively on lobster fishing, Matinicus
lobstermen argue that they should not be subjected to the more restrictive trap
limits that have been imposed on other subzoned islands.135 As Matinicus
lobsterman Clay Philbrook has said, unlike some other lobster fishing
communities, many of which also have a significant summer tourist industry
that lessens their residents’ dependence on the lobster industry, Matinicus
Islanders “have nothing else.”136

132 Id. at 224. This recommendation further threatens the survival of perimeter-defended groups—which
are already on the decline as a result of the new zone system and increased law enforcement. Id. at 51–56. As
Professor Acheson notes, “[I]t is ironic to see government officials dedicated to the cause of ‘conservation’
working against the establishment of local-level conservation zones, especially when the fishermen in the two
existing zones have proven able and willing to impose very restrictive conservation rules on themselves.” Id.
at 225.
133 Id. at 51, 60–61.
134 Auciello, supra note 1; see also ACHESON, supra note 9, at 61 (describing the conservation rationale
underlying the Monhegan subzone). Of course, the Matinicus Islanders’ notion of preserving the fishing
bottom for their descendants arguably promotes conservation: one observer of the territorial system notes that
it

has worked well to protect islanders’ livelihoods, as well as the lobster stocks. “It’s a means of
sustainable fishing,” he says. “It’s a means of conserving fish. . . . If you’re fishing the same
bottom year after year, you’re not going to screw it up. . . . You’re going to protect your family’s
future.”
Flannery, supra note 3 (alterations in original) (quoting Reverend Theodore Hoskins, a former itinerant
minister to Matinicus Island).
135 Goodnough, supra note 1 (“Mr. Philbrook said Matinicus should not have to accept a lower trap limit
because its economy is in a more desperate state than Monhegan’s, which benefits from tourism as well as
fishing. ‘It’s a different situation,’ [Mr. Philbrook] said. ‘We have nothing else.’”).
136 Id.; see also ACHESON, supra note 9, at 54 (noting that lobster fishing is the only way to make a living
in many island communities).
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II. COOPERATION AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT BY SMALL GROUPS
Communities like Matinicus Island, which successfully cooperate to
harvest CPRs, are the subjects of studies in a growing social science literature.
These researchers, led by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom, have undertaken
empirical studies of groups that sustainably manage CPRs without
intervention.137
More generally, the ability of groups to successfully cooperate and selfregulate has been the focus of a subset of the field of law and economics, often
identified as the New Chicago School138 and sometimes referred to as law and
social norms (or just law and norms) scholarship.139 Many of these legal
scholars are fascinated with private communities—from cattle ranchers140 to
cotton merchants141 to diamond traders142—that have been able to develop
highly successful and efficient cooperative institutions that operate
137 See, e.g., OSTROM ET AL., supra note 19, at 225–316 (reciting field studies on irrigation systems,
coastal fisheries, groundwater systems, and other organized CPRs); THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra
note 42 (collecting studies of communities located in such diverse places as the Canadian subarctic, lowland
Amazonia, Papua New Guinea, Botswana, southeastern Borneo, northern Spain, Ireland, and Iceland).
Professor Ostrom draws conclusions from the many empirical findings reported by numerous political
scientists studying different communities. See, e.g., OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 19, at
58 (finding that long-enduring CPRs designed basic operational rules, created organizations for operational
management, and modified rules over time); Thomas Dietz et al., The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302
SCIENCE 1907, 1910 fig.3 (2003) (identifying the requirements of adaptive governance in complex systems
and the general principles of governance of governmental resources that satisfy them); Elinor Ostrom,
Reformulating the Commons, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN
THE AMERICAS 17, 29 box 1.1 (Burger et al. eds., 2001) (identifying design principles present in long-enduring
CPRs).
138 See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 661, 663 (1998) (describing
how the New Chicago School aims to understand structures of regulation outside of the law); see also, e.g.,
Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605, 613
(2004).
139 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781,
1781 (2000) (“[T]he relationship between law and social norms, between legal and nonlegal sanctions, is
flourishing . . . .”).
140 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 52–64 (1991)
(describing the effectiveness of private social norms in influencing the behavior of Shasta County cattle
ranchers).
141 Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules,
Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745 (2001) (describing the efficiency of the cotton
industry’s private arbitration system).
142 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (describing the efficiency of the diamond industry’s private arbitration
system); Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond
Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383, 409–13 (2006) (describing how Jewish family and
community institutions allow for effective extralegal enforcement of diamond credit sales in different settings).
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extralegally. Using game theory and other theoretical frameworks, this
scholarship examines the cooperative behavior employed by these groups and
contrasts such self-regulation with traditional legal forms of regulation.
A. Extralegal Group Management of the Commons
Unlike the “tragedy of the commons” depicted in Garrett Hardin’s classic
account,143 contemporary commons scholarship concludes that, under the right
circumstances, individuals dependent upon a CPR can, even if “left to
themselves[,] . . . work out a system that achieves regulation over the
commons.”144 Such cooperative self-regulation is depicted as a viable, and in
many instances superior, alternative to the traditional all-or-nothing choice
between full private ownership of, or full governmental authority over,
CPRs.145 Studies of successful communal self-regulation “provide strong
evidence against the assumption that there is only one institutional way to
solve all problems related to common-pool resource systems.”146
Certain local communities and small groups are more likely than others to
achieve a system of successful self-regulation.147 Ostrom has produced a
comprehensive list of factors that affect a group’s ability to cooperate and
produce rules to manage the CPRs it collectively controls.148 Of the fifteen

143 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (arguing that multiple
individuals, each acting in her rational self-interest, will ultimately deplete a resource, and thus concluding that
“[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all”).
144 Elinor Ostrom, Institutional Arrangements for Resolving the Commons Dilemma: Some Contending
Approaches, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 42, at 250, 251.
145 Id. at 251–52. Professor Ostrom notes that “[a]dvocates of both positions share the assumption that a
particular form of institutional arrangement is necessary” for every common-pool situation. Id. at 251. By
contrast, her approach “acknowledges that communal ownership rather than private ownership or central
control, can be an optimal institutional arrangement for some types of common-resource problems.” Id. at
251–52.
146 Id. at 262.
147 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 1 (“There are a number of cases where local-level communities and
governments have been able to generate rules to effectively manage resources at sustainable levels. However,
at this point it is not at all clear why some communities have succeeded in conserving the resources on which
their livelihood depends when the vast majority have failed.” (citations omitted)).
148 Professor Ostrom’s complete list includes:

[T]he type of production and allocation functions; the predictability of resource flows; the
relative scarcity of the good; the size of the group involved; the heterogeneity of the group; the
dependence of the group on the good; common understanding of the group; the size of the total
collective benefit; the marginal contribution by one person to the collective good; the size of the
temptation to free ride; the loss to cooperators when others do not cooperate; having a choice of
participating or not; the presence of leadership; past experience and level of social capital; the
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factors she names, many may explain the relative successes (and nonsuccesses)
of different lobster gangs.149 For example, Ostrom concludes that a small,
homogenous group that is highly dependent on the resource in question and
has the autonomy to make binding rules will be more likely to develop
informal rules than groups that do not share those qualities, or which share
them to a lesser extent.150 And, at least in some instances, other land use
models fail to preserve the ecological environment as efficiently as those
already established by local communities.151
In establishing rules and norms, and maintaining them once created, a
strong sense of community may be crucial.152 In communities that are
autonomy to make binding rules; and a wide diversity of rules that are used to change the
structure of the situation.
Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 137,
148. But see Arun Agrawal, Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources, 29
WORLD DEV. 1649, 1651 (2001) (“Given the large number of factors . . . that have been highlighted as being
critical to the organization, adaptability, and sustainability of common property, it is fair to suggest that
existing work has yet to develop fully a theory of what makes for sustainable common-pool resource
management.”).
149 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 208.
150 Ostrom, supra note 148, at 151 (arguing that the ability of local users to create their own rules and
enforce effective sanctions facilitates the resolution of collective action and monitoring programs); accord
ACHESON, supra note 9, at 224 (“[P]eople in small social units are more able to provide themselves with rules
in the common good than those in large units where people are less able to come to consensus and monitor
each other’s behavior.”); OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 19, at 185 (describing how small
groups, unlike their larger counterparts, were able to establish organized and effective systems); Ostrom, supra
note 137, at 34 (identifying dependency, trust, and autonomy as factors leading to the maintenance of rules).
But see Arun Agrawal, Small Is Beautiful, but Is Larger Better? Forest-Management Institutions in the
Kumaon Himalaya, India, in PEOPLE AND FORESTS: COMMUNITIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND GOVERNANCE 57, 73–
74 (Clark C. Gibson et al. eds., 2000) (challenging the notion that collective action always becomes easier as a
group gets smaller based on his finding that, in the context of village forest councils in the Himalayas,
“councils with a larger membership find it easier to organize successfully for collective action, and the smaller
councils face difficulties in organizing successfully,” and postulating that this result suggests that, at least in
certain circumstances, there is a minimum aggregate group surplus necessary to enable the group to protect its
collective property interest vis-à-vis outsiders). See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 36–45 (1990) (discussing the emergence and
persistence of informal constraints in institutional structures).
151 See, e.g., Brian Houseal et al., Indigenous Cultures and Protected Areas in Central America,
CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Feb. 1985, at 10, 10 (“There are no other land use models for the tropical rain forest
that preserve ecological stability or biological diversity as efficiently as those of the indigenous groups
presently encountered there.”); David Western et al., The Status of Wildlife in Protected Areas Compared to
Non-Protected Areas of Kenya, 4 PLOS ONE e6140 (2009), http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/
journal.pone.0006140 (“[W]ildlife on private and community sanctuaries is stable or increasing, in contrast to
the declines in [state] protected areas . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
152 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 71 (“Recently, a number of scholars have argued that one of the most
important factors allowing some groups to develop rules to solve collective action dilemmas is a sense of
community and the social capital that is found in communities.” (citing SARA SINGLETON, CONSTRUCTING
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dependent on a resource, this sense of community will tend to foster a strong
conservation ethic.153 In economic terms, there is “little to distinguish . . . a
conservation ethic from a low discount rate. The first stresses a culture of
conservation; the second places value on future rewards. The essence of both
is the willingness to sacrifice present gains for future rewards.”154
Such studies, and the conclusions drawn from them, have been used by
these same scholars and others to design and advocate for new types of
institutions to manage common resources.155 The comanagement zone system
adopted in Maine is a prime example. Professor Acheson was both one of the
leading advocates for, and architects of, this system.156 This comanagement
system was deliberately designed to promote group-level efficiency by giving
rule-making authority to the lobstermen, and to facilitate cooperation among

COOPERATION: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS OF COMANAGEMENT (1998), and Sara Singleton & Michael
Taylor, Common Property, Collective Action and Community, 3 J. THEORETICAL POL. 309–24 (1992)));
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 19, at 183–84 .
153 See, e.g., ACHESON, supra note 9, at 78 (finding that a strong sense of community has led to the
maintenance of rules in some harbors); Houseal et al., supra note 151, at 10 (describing how native peoples in
Central America have devised sustainable long-term land use practices, which maintain cultural traditions of
individual communities); Western et al., supra note 151, at 5 (finding that community initiatives are necessary
to sustain free-ranging herbivore populations in Kenya). But see Terra Lawson-Remer, Do Stronger Collective
Property Rights Increase Household Income? Evidence from a Field Study in Fiji 9 (May 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628234 (“The wide range of
studies regarding the environmental outcomes associated with collective ownership have reached conflicting
conclusions.”).
154 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 221. In fact,
the higher the probability that people will be able to harvest all or most of a resource in the
future, the more willing they will be to devise rules to conserve those resources. This means that
people will be more willing to invest in rules when . . . the area exploited by a group is reserved
for that group and there are limits on entering that group . . . [and] there is the ability to enforce
rules, which, in turn, depends on group size and heterogeneity.
Id.; see also Adler, supra note 16, at 20 (“Whether the owner of a given resource is an individual, a
corporation, or a community, the security of the property right enables the owner to plan the present and future
use of the resource so as to maximize the resource’s present value, which includes the discounted value of
future harvests.”); Elinor Ostrom & Harini Nagendra, Insights on Linking Forests, Trees, and People from the
Air, on the Ground, and in the Laboratory, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 19224, 19230 (2006) (“When users
are genuinely engaged in decisions regarding rules that affect their use, the likelihood of users following the
rules and monitoring others is much greater than when an authority simply imposes rules on users.”).
155 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 100. CPR research has had only a modest impact domestically, with
Maine’s comanaged zone licensing system, see supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text, and comanagment
of Pacific salmon fisheries in the state of Washington, OSTROM, INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 19, at
285, the most notable cases in which it has had a direct impact.
156 See ACHESON, supra note 9, at 99, 103.

SAUNDERS GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/29/2011 11:54 AM

A SEA CHANGE OFF THE COAST OF MAINE

1351

the relatively small number of individuals who fish within the same zone.157
The same research that helped propel the movement to enact the Maine
comanagement law158 could be used to create legal protections of other
existing communities, as has already occurred in other countries. For example,
as discussed in detail in Part III below, communities in Brazil,159 Sumatra,160
and Scotland161 (among others162) are already the beneficiaries of legally
vested interests in resources they communally manage.163
B. Effective Self-Regulation by “Close-Knit” Groups
Legal scholars too are increasingly interested in the ability of certain
groups to successfully self-regulate. The now-enormous field of legal
scholarship dealing with effective, extralegal social norms can be traced to
Professor Robert Ellickson’s groundbreaking study of Shasta County ranchers

157 Id. at 97–98; see also Rieser, supra note 43, at 825 (discussing “the concept of ‘co-management’” as a
deliberate attempt to replicate a “common ownership regime”).
158 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 99 (noting that CPR literature “documenting the local-level conservation
rules found in a large number of fishing communities” was a factor positively influencing the push for the
comanagement system in Maine).
159 See, e.g., Lee P. Breckenridge, Protection of Biological and Cultural Diversity: Emerging Recognition
of Local Community Rights in Ecosystems Under International Environmental Law, 59 TENN. L. REV. 735,
779 (1992) (describing how, in Brazil, the government has vested specific local communities with
usufructuary rights in designated areas of state-owned forests “to harvest rubber and other non-timber
products, and it agrees to protect these communities from incompatible exploitation of resources by others”).
160 Koen Kusters et al., Towards Solutions for State vs. Local Community Conflicts over Forestland: The
Impact of Formal Recognition of User Rights in Krui, Sumatra, Indonesia, 35 HUM. ECOLOGY 427, 435 (2007)
(describing the impact of a 1998 decree issued by the Indonesian government enabling certain communities to
register for concession (use) rights over areas of state forests).
161 A. Fiona D. Mackenzie, A Common Claim: Community Land Ownership in the Outer Hebrides,
Scotland, 4 INT’L J. COMMONS 319, 320 (2010) (describing community purchases of large tracts of land in the
Scottish Highlands and Islands, placing “Scotland at the ‘cusp’, globally, of . . . ‘community-centric’ land
reform”).
162 See, e.g., Fikret Berkes, Common-Property Resource Management and Cree Indian Fisheries in
Subarctic Canada, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 42, at 66–68 (discussing treaty granting
fishing rights to Cree in Canada); Lawson-Remer, supra note 153 (discussing ownership by family sub-groups
of inshore reef-fishing territories in Fiji); Tracy Yandle, Sharing Natural Resource Management
Responsibility: Examining the New Zealand Rock Lobster Co-Management Experience, 39 POL’Y SCI. 249,
274 (2006) (noting the creation in New Zealand “of mataitai reserves which define geographic areas where
commercial fishing is prohibited, and noncommercial fishing is managed by traditional Maori methods”).
163 In the United States, the recognition of exclusive “conservation-oriented” fishing zones around
Monhegan and Swan’s Islands arguably constitutes an example of such legal protection. And, as discussed
below in Part III, international environmentalists have identified the global protection of local communities
and indigenous groups that sustainably manage CPRs as an important principle. See Breckenridge, supra note
159, at 776 (describing how UNCED documents incorporate notions of local rights into the development of
international environmental law).
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who resolve their disputes beyond “the shadow of the law.”164 After this work
and the many others it inspired, it is well accepted that small, close-knit groups
may sometimes use social norms to self-regulate and resolve disputes
privately.
The basic principle derived from these studies is the notion that small
groups can and do work effectively without legal intervention or supervision
because the ongoing and close relationships among members cause them to
avoid conflict and cooperate with one another through informal norms.165
Even in market settings with significant amounts of money at stake, groups
may rely on extralegal norms of conflict resolution and thereby avoid the high
transaction costs associated with bringing formal legal claims.166
This legal scholarship often contrasts effective community norms and rules
with legal rules and sanctions that may prove less effective.167 For example,
where a Pennsylvania coal company depends upon maintaining good
relationships with community members who constitute its workforce, it has an
incentive not to conduct its operations in a manner that will cause the
destruction of community members’ homes.168 This incentive exists whether
or not the company has a legal obligation to avoid this result.169 “So long as

164

ELLICKSON, supra note 140, at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See e.g., id. (describing how a conscious commitment to cooperation among ranchers creates trespass
norms independent of formal legal entitlements); OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 19, at 88–
89 (noting that successful group managers of CPRs include members who “have shared a past and expect to
share a future” but not “participants who vary greatly in regard to ownership of assets, skills, knowledge,
ethnicity, race, or other variables that could strongly divide a group of individuals”); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 85 (1999)
(“[A]s a general matter, successful CPR management was dependent on small numbers and a similarity of
interests.”).
166 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 141. Most obviously these include time and money, which are wasted
when one brings a legal claim rather than invoking or utilizing a less formal process. Id. at 1740. It can also
be inefficient in other ways. For example, a private dispute resolution system for a small group that is
composed of members of the group may have expert information that makes them superior judges. See, e.g.,
id. at 1741 (“[I]ndustry-expert arbitrators . . . can make many factual determinations more accurately and less
expensively than a judge or jury can . . . .”).
167 Richard A. Epstein, Enforcing Norms: When the Law Gets in the Way, 7 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Fall 1997, at 4, 11.
168 Id. at 12 (discussing the effect of the decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922)).
169 Id. Arguably the coal miners were positioned equally well before enactment of the state law regulating
subsurface rights of the coal companies and after the Supreme Court concluded the regulation was an
unconstitutional taking. Id. In neither case did the coal company want to incur the social costs associated with
taking an action that would result in the destruction of a house, despite its legal ability to do so. Id. The coal
miners were in a slightly better position after passage of the law and during pendency of the coal company’s
165
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there are repeat transactions between parties, there is good reason to believe
that social norms will be respected even if not backed by the force of law.”170
Thus, social norms may be preferable to formal rules in cases where they
operate effectively.171
This academic literature has explained norm effectiveness mostly in terms
of the social sanctions and rewards triggered by individual conformity (or
nonconformity) with the relevant group’s rules and norms. In the classic
treatment, reputational consequences of behavior are considered the primary
(or, sometimes, only) factor motivating behavior.172 This is true even when
cooperation is observed in settings where social sanctions or rewards are
unlikely to explain the behavior, such as when subway riders choose, against
self-interest, to stand in more crowded sections of a subway car to give
personal space to a couple standing in a less crowded section.173

lawsuit, when uncertainty regarding such action’s legal consequences would have increased the coal miner’s
bargaining position in marginal cases. Id.
170 Id.
171 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1815–20 (1996) (concluding that a private system
enforced by social norms within the feed and grain industry is more efficient than the UCC’s use of inherent
business norms); Bernstein, supra note 141, at 1761 (“In sum, the cotton industry has succeeded in creating a
private legal system and a social and informational infrastructure of trade that improves on the substantive
rules and adjudicative procedures in the public system and is well-designed to maximize the value of
transactors’ legally enforceable and legally unenforceable commitments.”); Richman, supra note 142, at 384
(noting that the informal system utilized by diamond traders is “less costly, more reliable, and thus superior” to
legal regulation); Randall W. Stone & Stephen E. Gent, Formalizing Informal Cooperation: Norm-Based
Cooperation and the European Stability and Growth Pact 16 (Feb. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/pec/papers/Stone_Gent_06.pdf (“[N]orm-based cooperation is not
simply a best available substitute when rigorous enforcement is impractical, but rather is generally optimal.”);
cf. Epstein, supra note 167, at 15 (“The excesses of big government today often stem from a systematic
misevaluation of the relative value of social and legal norms.”).
172 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 140, at 180–81 (reputation in ranching communities); Bernstein,
supra note 141, at 1745 (reputation-based rationing in the cotton industry); Richman, supra note 142, at 401
(reputation as a mechanism for multilateral exchange in the diamond industry).
173 Strahilevitz, supra note 23, at 363. One commentator notes this example, among others, and further
observes that
individuals in a group setting “reciprocate the behavior of others: if they perceive that other
group members are restraining themselves in the face of temptations to behave contrary to a
group’s collective interests, most individuals display similar self-restraint; if, in contrast, they
become convinced that those around [them] are putting their own interests ahead of the group’s,
most individuals again respond in kind, availing themselves of any available opportunities to
advance their own interests at the expense of collective ones.”
Id. at 364 (quoting Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: A Theory of Collective Action and Law
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)); accord Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34
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Recently, economists have demonstrated that incorporating identity into the
economic equation can explain behavior that otherwise appears to be
economically irrational.174 Such identity-based motivations may help explain
altruistic behavior in situations where neither the threat of social sanctions nor
the potential reward of social approbation likely accounts for all observed
norm compliance, as for example, when one tips a city taxi driver.175
Intrinsically, membership in a small, close-knit community is likely to be
fundamental to an individual’s self-identity or self-concept.176 This identity

WAKE FOREST L. REV. 639, 646–47 (1999) (positing that mimicry may occur based on the usually incorrect
assumption that other people possess valuable private information).
174 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715, 745–
48 (2000) (describing how identity influences economic outcomes). See generally id. at 716 n.2
(distinguishing identity theory from economic literature on norms in which “a norm is obeyed because failure
to do so results in punishment” and instead arguing that “agents follow prescriptions, for the most part, to
maintain their self-concepts”). It is possible that a biological instinct toward altruism and cooperation has
evolved and that such an instinct may derive from the benefits inherent in such cooperation at the small-group
level. See Nicholas Wade, We May Be Born with an Urge to Help, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, at D1 (“[T]he
human capacity for cooperation ‘seems to have evolved mainly for interactions within the local group’ . . . .”
(quoting Dr. Tomasello, a developmental psychologist who is co-director of the Max Planck Institute for
Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany)). An individual’s identity may be constructed through a
variety of factors and circumstances, including through rituals and other “socialization techniques.” See
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1181, 1183 & n.7 (2005) (“For ritual,
the coercive force is exercised, not chiefly through ex post sanctions, but rather through the ex ante technique
of assigning social roles to individuals and inducing them and others to accept the roles thus assigned as
natural and appropriate.”); id. at 1183 n.7 (“All sorts of socialization techniques (parenting, schools, religious
instruction, etc.) serve a similar function [to ritual], as do broader social institutions in which people function
in their daily lives, such as popular culture and even language itself.”).
175 See Geisinger, supra note 138, at 614 (arguing that “rational choice does not explain all norm origin
and development” and developing a “theory of norm formation and development based on the notion that
individuals conceive of themselves not just as individuals, but also as members of groups. This ‘group identity
theory’ provides a much different picture of norm formation and development than that of rational choice.”);
cf. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the
Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2005) (“At the core, these situations force us to confront whether
the law can induce us to act because we believe we should, rather than because we fear legal or social
sanctions.” (emphasis added)).
176 See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals
in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 81 (2004) (“That communities are valuable to people should
come as no surprise. It is a key finding of a vast ethnographic literature and resonates well with common
experience.” (footnote omitted)). Even a less significant (or virtually insignificant) group identity created by
the formation of groups based on “random assignment of subjects to labels” can have substantial effects on an
individual’s behavior. Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 174, at 720 (“[E]ven arbitrary social categorizations
affect behavior.”). And, “because identity is fundamental to behavior, choice of identity may be the most
important ‘economic’ decision people make. Individuals may—more or less consciously—choose who they
want to be. Limits on this choice may also be the most important determinant of an individual’s economic
well-being.” Id. at 717; cf. Bernstein, supra note 141, at 1787 (“[T]he stability of . . . cooperative-based
commercial systems may also be due, in whole or in part, to the fact that social norms of honor, particularly
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effect has significant behavioral consequences for which traditional economic
models have not fully accounted. Better monitoring, repeat transactions, and
more opportunities to control behavior through social rewards and sanctions
are not the only factors affecting a community’s success. Its success may be
based, at least in part, on the fact that a member of a close-knit community
esteems himself as such and chooses, in most instances, to validate this identity
through compliance with its rules.177 This “identity-motivator” will impact an
individual’s behavior even in situations where only self-monitoring occurs.178
As a general matter, law and norms scholarship has often focused on the
extralegal nature of group self-regulation, concluding that establishment of
private groups may be a better alternative to legal regulation.179 Another
strand has focused on how law itself may be utilized to create norms and
operate to change behavior.180 But such scholarship generally does not grapple
when reinforced through . . . a basic human desire to think of one’s self as trustworthy, are more powerful
motivators of transactional behavior than economic models of behavior typically assume.” (footnote omitted)).
177 See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 356 (1997). Professor McAdams has suggested an explanation for such behavior in line with the
external motivation, which he calls an “esteem” model of behavior. Id. at 377. This view suggests that
compliance with social norms in situations where there is no obvious sanction for misbehavior can be
explained as motivated by the desire to earn the esteem of others in the community. Id. at 358. But even in
this esteem model, which ostensibly looks for external motivation to explain altruism, McAdams recognizes
that “social norms” may be followed because an individual “feel[s] obligated to follow [them] because of an
internalized sense of duty.” Id. at 340. This appears to be in line with the internal, identity-based motivation
described by Akerlof and Kranton and others. See supra note 174.
178 See McAdams, supra note 177, at 381 (“The individual feels psychological discomfort whether or not
others detect her violation.”). In the context of lobster fishing, for example, because individual lobstermen
spend so much of their time fishing alone (or with a single partner), group monitoring of the individual
behavior of community members may not always be possible to the same extent as in other close-knit groups
that have been studied. Yet, it is not clear whether there would be a markedly lower rate of rule compliance in
the absence of such monitoring by the larger group. Cf. Richman, supra note 142, at 404–08 (describing the
opportunities for diamond cutters who are members of ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities to cheat and how
their values may be a substantial factor in the rule-compliance rate); Vandenbergh, supra note 175, at 1102
(recognizing that in some cases people can be “induce[d] . . . to act because [they] believe [they] should, rather
than because [they] fear legal or social sanctions”).
179 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 141, at 1788 (“[P]rivate commercial law systems can offer
transactors . . . benefits that are either unavailable or only available at great cost through the public legal
system.”); Epstein, supra note 167, at 15 (“Social norms without legal enforcement do an enormous good.”).
180 See Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms,
36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 367–68 (2002) (characterizing “law and social norms” scholarship as arguing that
“[l]aw might have a constructive role to play in fostering these behavioral mechanisms, but otherwise it should
simply get out of the way of their natural evolution”). To the extent that norms scholars view law as desirable,
it is usually only as a tool to create or bolster norms, which will then serve to affect private behavior through
the same system of social sanctions and rewards. Geisinger, supra note 138, at 650 (“Expressive theorists
argue that the state, through lawmaking or other means, can alter the normative meaning of particular acts as a
means of more efficiently constraining behavior.”); Kahan, supra, at 367–68.
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with how law might be employed to protect the private groups themselves. For
the first strand, this strategy would be the antithesis of the project of moving
away from legal protection. And for the second, the focus is on expanding
“good” norms to impact larger communities, or on changing “bad” norms, but
not on protecting smaller communities that are already utilizing norms in a
socially productive way.
Furthermore, in addition to the externalities created by legal intervention,
legalizing norms has at least the potential to fundamentally alter group identity
and relationships among group members, thereby unraveling the group’s selfregulatory effectiveness.181 Likewise, while the zone licensing system
consciously tracked some of the boundaries of existing customary territories,
its other features—expressly permitting fishing over the existing boundary
lines and declining to recognize territorial boundaries that fell within the
zones—encouraged the dissipation of norms protecting these boundaries
181 For example, the imposition of a formal trap limit on the Maine lobster industry forced certain
lobstermen to fish fewer traps but may have undermined an informal norm that favored even lower trap use.
Thus, the unforeseen effect of the trap limit was to increase the number of traps being fished, as some
fishermen increased their numbers upwards to the new legal limit. See ACHESON, supra note 9, at 131 (“There
was money to be earned in the lobster fishery, and people responded by putting more traps in the water to get
higher catches and returns.”). Furthermore, to the extent that part of a group identity is built on a group selfconcept as self-sufficient or hostile to government intervention, the very act of endorsement or intervention by
the state could be shattering for the group. See Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 174, at 739–40 (discussing that
some groups excluded from the dominant culture choose an “oppositional” identity characterized by rule or
law breaking); cf. Mackenzie, supra note 161, at 322 (using theories of norm-disruption designed by Michel
Foucault and Judith Butler to hypothesize that collective ownership by a community serves to disrupt norms
surrounding private ownership and thereby “opens up the meanings of the land to new possibilities”).
In addition, the existence of “legal” status may have meaning for an individual and for that individual
in relation to other members of his small group or culture. See Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim
Within the Same-Sex Marriage Controversy, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343, 362 (2008) (“We might well
agree, then, to acknowledge that marriage equality is in part an argument about the expression of identity.”).
Indeed, the “identity” effect of proposed legislation may be a central motivating factor for groups lobbying for
and against it. See id. at 351 (“[Marriage] confers a status, an identity, and a kinship network, above and
beyond its tangible benefits.”). In the context of the gay marriage debate, some people may insist that there
should be legal recognition of gay marriage rather than civil unions to demonstrate that the identity of a couple
as “married” does not connote sexual orientation. See id. at 359 (“Advocates of marriage equality typically
seek to appropriate the legitimacy, status, and identity [that it provides] . . . .”). Likewise, a group favoring
civil unions may also have identity motivations, desiring to grant equivalent rights to all people, but retaining
the idea that something is fundamentally “different” about heterosexual and homosexual couples. See id. at
351 (noting “the recurring rhetoric of pollution and desecration” in the marriage debate). One recent article
proposes that the challenge to same-sex marriage is essentially a cultural property claim to the institution by
straight couples. See id. at 343–44 (“This Article will argue that the traditionalist claim that same-sex couples
should be excluded from marriage is the same kind of claim as is often made by Native American, indigenous,
and other culturally-subordinated groups to certain cultural resources—a right to exclude others in order to
protect sacred objects, places, and rituals, so as to preserve and perpetuate group identity over time.” (footnote
omitted)).
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against incursions. Thus, “legalizing” rules and norms is not always—or
perhaps even often—desirable.182
Yet, without some legal mechanism for preserving institutions and groups
that rely solely upon extralegal norms, some or all of the very communities
generating scholarly interest because of their success and efficiency may be
regulated out of existence and replaced with something less desirable. Thus,
for those policymakers interested in preserving the positive aspects of these
communities, some form of legal protection may need to be considered.
III. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GROUPS
Although the academic interest in small groups discussed in Part II is
generally focused on the extralegal nature of small group self-regulation, and
not on legal protection of these groups, group-level legal rights have been
recognized since before the emergence of American property law.
Historically, courts have sometimes recognized, and have even given
substantial weight to, the right or authority of groups to control or govern
common property. More recently, formal recognition of a similar kind of
group property right—a right to property of special significance to a group’s
cultural heritage—has been the subject of a growing number of international
treaties and federal statutes. Finally, outside of the United States, some
communities enjoy formal legal property rights in fisheries and other
communal resources.
A. Common Law Recognition of Community-Level Rights
As Professor Rose has thoroughly documented, the concept of communal
property rights has historical roots. Under English common law, into the
nineteenth century, communities had a recognized right to the exclusive use of
certain common property.183 Under this system, “those communities (but not
outsiders) enjoyed rights to such various economic and recreational uses of
land, and they were expected to govern their own behavior through reasonable
community norms.”184

182 See, e.g., Bernstein, note 141, at 1787 (“[The] benefits . . . created through the use of private
institutions . . . cannot be fully replicated through private contracts and the use of public institutions.”).
183 Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 739–44 (1986); Rose, supra note 16, at 179.
184 Rose, supra note 16, at 179.
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As a general rule, early American courts did not recognize a similar
right.185 Yet, nineteenth-century American courts did recognize other rights
that had the effect of recognizing or vesting authority in certain communities.
Certain riparian rights, for example, “effectively turned river-bank landowners
into participants in common property regimes for particular rivers, from which
outsiders were excluded.”186
Other early American judges also formalized or took into account
extralegal community norms.187 For example, in Ghen v. Rich, a nineteenthcentury court not only embraced a claim based on local custom in the whaling
industry, but went so far as to say that, “although local usages of a particular
port ought not to be allowed to set aside the general maritime law, this
objection [does] not apply to a custom which embraced an entire business, and
ha[s] been concurred in for a long time by every one engaged in the trade.”188
The practical effect of decisions such as this one was legal recognition of
group-level rights—at least on occasion—and deference to local governing
authorities.

185 Professor Rose posits that this is likely owing to the tension between then-contemporary views of
constitutional government and the de facto governance role enjoyed by communities with communal rights in
England at the time. Rose, supra note 183, at 741 (noting the view that recognition of customary rights was
“‘uncongenial with the genius of our government and with the spirit of independence’ of our farmers” (quoting
Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. 639, 649 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833))); Rose, supra note 16, at 179 n.163
(“Courts in the United States were more hostile to customary claims, partly because of the feudal origin of
such claims and partly because their informal governance role seemed contrary to constitution-based
government.”). Some examples of community uses that were recognized formally through public easements
include for annual festivals, see, e.g., Hall v. Nottingham, [1876] 33 Ir. L.T.R. 697 (Exch. Div.) (maypole
dancing), and sporting events, see, e.g., Mounsey v. Ismay, [1863] 158 Eng. Rep. 1077 (Q.B.) (horseracing);
Fitch v. Rawling, [1795] 126 Eng. Rep. 614 (K.B.) (cricket).
186 Rose, supra note 16, at 179.
187 Even decisions whose outcomes failed to defer to local custom were at least viewed as controversial.
In Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), for example, the court ruled against a hunter who had
argued that his “hot pursuit” of a fox vested him with a property interest in the animal that was superior to that
of the defendant who had intercepted and killed it. The court rejected the hunter’s claim—despite the fact that
“all hunters in the region regarded hot pursuit as giving rights to take an unimpeded first possession.” Richard
A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1231 (1979). The result was a vehement
protest by a dissenting judge, who decried the majority’s interference with “usage or custom which the
experience of ages has sanctioned, and which must be so well known to every votary of Diana.” Pierson, 3
Cai. 175 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
188 8 F. 159, 161 (D. Mass. 1881). The dispute giving rise to the action arose over the ownership of a
whale carcass. Id. at 160. The whale had been killed by the plaintiff, but then purchased at auction by the
defendant from a man who had found it but had failed to “send[] word to Princeton, as is customary.” Id. The
court noted that “[t]he usage on Cape Cod, for many years, has been that the person who kills a whale in the
manner and under the circumstances described, owns it, and this right has never been disputed until this case.”
Id.
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The common law of nuisance can also be viewed as incorporation of, and
respect for, community norms in property law.189 While nuisance cases
formally pit one property owner against another (or others), the standards, or
norms, of the locality often drive their outcomes.
Thus, a community that has gentrified and overwhelmingly attained a
residential character can stop a brickwork installation on nuisance grounds.190
By contrast, the old common law “coming to the nuisance” principle allowed
“noxious” communities to preserve their character against unwanted, new
residential intruders.191 Like many other areas of law, common law nuisance

189 See Rose, supra note 16, at 179 (“Nuisance law, using precepts very like those of riparian law,
effectively created common property regimes among the neighbors for the reasonable preservation of their
common enjoyment of quiet, clean air, and water; again, the participants were expected to act according to
‘reasonable’ norms of mutual forbearance. It has only been a failure of our own imagination that has kept us
from seeing these judicially-created regimes [such as nuisance law] for what they are—common property
regimes involving emergent resource uses, including only imprecisely specified participants.” (footnote
omitted)).
190 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding the constitutionality of an ordinance
prohibiting the manufacture of bricks within specified limits of Los Angeles). A contemporary example is the
proposal in Arizona to enact new legislation that would hold cattle owners liable for damage caused by their
livestock. Marc Lacey, Uneasy Neighbors on the Open Range, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, at A14. The
current statute places the burden on the potential victims to fence their property or bear any consequences.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-1427 (2011). Opponents of the proposed legislation, including the Arizona
Cattlemen’s Association, claim that putting “the liability on the ranchers if an animal gets out would be
devastating to [the] industry.” Lacey, supra.
191 See, e.g., Mahlstadt v. City of Indianola, 100 N.W.2d 189 (Iowa 1959) (overturning an injunction
against a dump in a residential neighborhood, where the dump had preexisted residential usage); Jerry Harmon
Motors v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass’n, 337 N.W.2d 427, 432 (N.D. 1983) (“We therefore conclude
that any individual or corporation or partnership that comes to an alleged nuisance has a heavy burden to
establish liability.” (footnote omitted)); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *400, *402–03
(“If my neighbor makes a tan-yard, so as to annoy and render less salubrious the air of my house or gardens,
the law will furnish me with a remedy; but if he is first in possession of the air, and I fix my habitation near
him, the nuisance is of my own seeking, and must continue.”). But cf. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev.
Co., 494 P.2d 701 (Ariz. 1972) (concluding that, because of the number of individuals affected, the health
hazards caused by a cattle feedlot constituted a public nuisance that could be enjoined, but also providing that
the residential developer was required to pay damages to compensate the feedlot owner). The majority
contemporary view considers as a factor whether a plaintiff “came to the nuisance,” but it is not dispositive of
whether he has an actionable claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D (1977) (“The fact that the
plaintiff has acquired or improved his land after a nuisance interfering with it has come into existence is not in
itself sufficient to bar his action, but it is a factor to be considered in determining whether the nuisance is
actionable.”).
There are other tort law examples of courts taking legal cognizance of groups, as such. In Ybarra v.
Spangard, for example, the California Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff’s res ipsa loquitur case to proceed
against a group of medical professionals despite the fact that no inference of wrongdoing could be drawn
against any individual defendant. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944). In effect, the decision can be viewed as a way of
legally encouraging the group to monitor one another and ensure proper behavior by each individual member.
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has been largely superseded by statute. Common law recognition of custom
and other community standards has given way to statutory regulation of most
property interests.192
B. Protections of Cultures and Communities Under International Law
Similar transformation has occurred in the international arena. Certain
collectively held cultural heritage rights have long been recognized as
customary international law. For example, restitution of cultural property
looted by conquering armies has long been recognized as a legal obligation.193
The concept that such looting is wrongful can be traced back to ancient
Egypt.194
Less tangible cultural heritage rights also have been recognized as part of
customary international law since at least the end of World War I. In 1921, the

See Saul Levmore, Rethinking Group Responsibility and Strategic Threats in Biblical Texts and Modern Law,
71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 85, 89, 105 n.61 (1995).
192 Many of the statutes codify common law principles, and in some cases, they serve to protect certain
interests in the same way that the old “coming to the nuisance” standard did. For example, “right to farm”
statutes protect against nuisance claims by residential communities that might complain about noxious owners.
See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Springsteen, States’ Right-to-Farm Statutes, NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CTR., http://www.
nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/righttofarm/index.html (last visited May 17, 2011) (“All fifty states have
enacted right-to-farm laws that seek to protect qualifying farmers and ranchers from nuisance lawsuits filed by
individuals who move into a rural area where normal farming operations exist, and who later use nuisance
actions to attempt to stop those ongoing operations. While the overall statutory schemes might be similar,
each state has noticeably different content in the specific details of the laws.”). One such example is N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2011), which provides in part that
[n]o agricultural or forestry operation or any of its appurtenances shall be or become a nuisance,
private or public, by any changed conditions in or about the locality thereof after the same has
been in operation for more than one year, when such operation was not a nuisance at the time the
operation began; provided, that the provisions of this subsection shall not apply whenever a
nuisance results from the negligent or improper operation of any such agricultural or forestry
operation or its appurtenances.
Id. § 106-701(a). Other types of statutes serve similar purposes. For example, Arizona maintains laws that put
the burden on property owners to fence and protect their individual parcels against damage by free-range
cattle. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-1427 (“An owner or occupant of land is not entitled to recover for
damage resulting from the trespass of animals unless the land is enclosed within a lawful fence . . . .”).
193 C. Franklin Sayre, Comment, Cultural Property Laws in India and Japan, 33 UCLA L. REV. 851, 857
n.25 (1986); Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting the “Cultural” and “Property” Aspects of Cultural
Property Under International Law, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1033, 1049 & n.49 (1993) (citing Sayre, supra).
194 See The Illicit Traffic of Cultural Property Throughout the World, INT’L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS,
http://archives.icom.museum/traffic.html (last updated July 11, 2005) (citing Véronique Pierron, L’UNESCO
et la Trafic des Biens Culturels, ARCHÉOLOGIA, Nov. 1992, at 38, 40, and JEAN VERCOUTTER, À LA
RECHERCHE DE L’ÉGYPTE OUBLIÉE (1986)) (“It was denounced in one of the oldest legal documents in Egypt
at the time of the pharaohs, in the Amherst Papyrus dating from 1134 BC.”).
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League of Nations’ Commission of Rapporteurs considered whether the small
island archipelago of the Aaland Islands, situated between southern Sweden
and southern Finland, could choose to break away from Finland and reunify
with Sweden.195 The Commission noted its appreciation of “the ardent desire,
the resolute wish of the Aaland population . . . to preserve intact the Swedish
language and culture—their heritage from their ancestors.”196
The
Commission was able to reconcile this appreciation with its ultimate
conclusion that the Aaland Islands should remain a part of Finland—but only
because “[t]he Finnish State [wa]s ready to grant the [Aalanders] satisfactory
guarantees” that they would have autonomy regarding their schools and
language.197 Absent these assurances, the Commission warned, it would then
be “force[d] . . . to advise the separation of the islands from Finland, based on
the wishes of the inhabitants which would be freely expressed by means of a
plebiscite.”198
A fishing community’s interest in economic survival has also been
recognized as relevant to discerning the contours of a customary international
law claim. In the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), the United
Kingdom objected to Norway’s traditional fishing zone border, which was
formally enacted into Norwegian law through a royal decree in 1935.199 The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in favor of Norway on the basis that
“the peculiar geography of the Norwegian coast” permitted the method it used
to draw its fishing zone boundary, consistent with customary international
law.200 Yet, before proceeding through its analysis of the customary
international law standards, the ICJ found relevant that “the inhabitants of the
[Norwegian] coastal zone derive their livelihood essentially from fishing” and
that this reality, among others, “must be borne in mind in appraising the
validity of the United Kingdom contention that the limits of the Norwegian
195

Report Presented to the Council of the League by the Comm. of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc.
B.7.21.68.106 1921 VII (1921) [hereinafter League of Nations Report]. The Aaland Islands were originally
part of Sweden, which ceded them to Russia, along with Finland (a Swedish province), following various wars
between Sweden and Russia. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS
118 (3d ed. 2010). Finland declared its independence from Russia following the outbreak of the Russian
Revolution, at which point the Aalanders, nearly all of whom spoke and identified as Swedish, insisted on a
plebiscite, which Finland refused to authorize. Id. At that point, Finland and Sweden approached the League
of Nations, which constituted first a committee and then a commission to determine the legal rights of the
Aalanders. Id. at 118, 120.
196 League of Nations Report, supra note 195, at 28.
197 Id. at 29.
198 Id. at 34.
199 1951 I.C.J. 116, 118 (Dec. 18).
200 Id. at 139.
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fisheries zone laid down in the 1935 Decree are contrary to international
law.”201 Though arguably dicta, this explicit recognition of the importance of
fishing to the inhabitants of the disputed area suggests that a community’s
survival interest may at least bolster a customary international law claim, if not
give rise to one.202
Because customary international law offered weak protection of cultural
claims to historical artifacts,203 stronger protections were eventually demanded
and achieved through the adoption of several multilateral conventions,
beginning during the post-World War II movement to formalize many
customary rights in treaty law. Three of these conventions are generally
considered the major sources of most international cultural property rights
worldwide.204 Each one, in addition to establishing definitions for cultural
property, affirmed the growing sentiment in the twentieth century in favor of
protecting cultural property.205
201

Id. at 128.
At the time of the Fisheries Case, Norway derived 3% of its national income from fisheries. DOUGLAS
M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 40 (1965). Furthermore, a few years later, the ICJ
ruled that the United Kingdom and Iceland had an obligation to negotiate in good faith to reach agreement
regarding fishing boundaries and that such negotiations would have to take into account, inter alia, Iceland’s
“special dependence” on the fisheries—as well as resource conservation concerns. See Fisheries Jurisdiction
(U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 3, 14 (July 25).
203 For example, customary international law does not require restitution for cultural property “removed
by economic or colonial conquest.” Mastalir, supra note 193, at 1049. “The products of so-called ‘Elginism,’
after the man who brought the Parthenon Marbles to England, have often remained in the acquisitive nation.”
Id. at 1049 & n.50 (citing Sayre, supra note 193, at 855).
204 See Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M.
1330, 1330 [hereinafter 1995 Convention]; Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 232–34
[hereinafter 1970 Convention]; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 240 [hereinafter 1954 Convention]; cf. Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2279–80, 1 Bevans 631. Nations also may
have additional or separate treaty obligations pursuant to bilateral treaties to which they are a party. See
Jonathan Drimmer, Hate Property: A Substantive Limitation for America’s Cultural Property Laws, 65 TENN.
L. REV. 691, 745 n.374 (1998) (listing bilateral treaties that the United States has entered into “with numerous
individual nations that render covered cultural properties fully inalienable and carry criminal as well as civil
penalties for trafficking within the United States”).
205 The principle favoring the protection of cultural artifacts from wartime expropriation and destruction
existed well before implementation of the 1954 Convention. The United States, for example, has generally
followed such a policy, at least since World War II. See REPORT OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR THE
PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS 48–49, 61 (1946) (“We are bound to
respect . . . monuments so far as war allows.”); see also Wayne Sandholtz, The Iraqi National Museum and
International Law: A Duty to Protect, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 185, 232 (2005) (noting extraordinary
measures taken by U.S. forces during World War II to protect culturally significant sites in Europe). This
policy continued in effect after World War II, see Mastalir, supra note 193, at 1048 & n.45 (citing Letter from
Ronald J. Bettauer, Attorney, Office of the Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Anne Coffin Hanson, President,
202
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The central purposes of all three conventions reflect the notion that an
individual’s cultural identity should be protected because such protections
benefit not only the individual and his culture, but also the entire global
community through the preservation of a rich, multicultural heritage.206 For
example, the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954 (the 1954 Convention) contains a broad
purpose statement reflecting the core principle that “damage to cultural
property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural
heritage of all mankind.”207 The Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property (the 1970 Convention) reiterates and expands on this sentiment,
announcing “that the interchange of cultural property among
nations . . . increases the knowledge of the civilization of Man, enriches the
cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual respect and appreciation among
nations” and “that . . . it is essential for every State to become increasingly
alive to the moral obligations to respect its own cultural heritage and that of all
nations.”208 Likewise, the Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects (the 1995 Convention) recognizes the “importance of the protection of
cultural heritage and of cultural exchanges for promoting understanding
between peoples, and the dissemination of culture for the well-being of
humanity and the progress of civilization . . . with the objective of improving
the preservation and protection of the cultural heritage in the interest of all.”209
As these conventions are agreements between nations, the rights they
extend do not attach to the specific group with a cultural interest in the relevant
property.210 Instead, the cultural property must be claimed by a signatory

Coll. Art Ass’n of Am., reprinted in 31 ART J. 488 (1972) (presenting the official State Department position in
response to a letter urging U.S. ratification of the 1954 Convention)), even though the United States did not
ratify the 1954 Convention until 2009, see United States of America Ratified Conventions, UNESCO,
http://portal.unesco.org/la/conventions_by_country.asp?language=E&typeconv=1&contr=US (last visited May
17, 2011).
206 Drimmer, supra note 204, at 696–97, 725–27.
207 1954 Convention, supra note 204, at 240 (“Being convinced that damage to cultural property
belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people
makes its contribution to the culture of the world; Considering that the preservation of the cultural heritage is
of great importance for all peoples of the world and that it is important that this heritage should receive
international protection.”).
208 1970 Convention, supra note 204, at 232–34.
209 1995 Convention, supra note 204, at 1330.
210 While vesting the right in the signatory state is consistent with conventional principles of international
law, modern treaties in other contexts do vest rights to bring claims in individuals or other entities. See, e.g.,
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 41–43 (1995). For
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nation-state, which is deemed the “owner” of the property.211 The potential
numbers of groups and types of property that could be claimed by a particular
nation-state are, however, quite expansive.212

example, human rights treaties often allow individual victims to file complaints with tribunals, which can
investigate and determine whether to hear the claim. See, e.g., Convention for the Protections of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 234 (creating the European
Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) in order “[t]o ensure the observance of the engagements
undertaken by the [parties to the Convention]”); id. art. 25, at 237 (expressly vesting the Commission with the
authority to “receive petitions . . . from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation [committed] by one of the [party-states to the Convention]”). In the
context of foreign direct investment, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) vest individuals and corporations who
are directly impacted by alleged breaches by party-states to bring claims directly on their own behalf in
binding arbitration. See Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on
Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim), 11 ICSID Rep. 295, ¶ 37 (Aug. 2, 2004) (“[T]he greatest innovation of ICSID
and other systems directed at the protection of foreign investments is precisely that the rights of investors are
not any longer subject to the political and other considerations by their governments, as was the case under the
old system of diplomatic protection . . . . Investors may today claim independently from the view of their
governments.”). Thus, it is possible to imagine regimes that vest more direct rights in the cultural groups
themselves than do currently existing cultural property conventions. See Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Actor
Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 977, 978 (2011)
(describing the essay’s intent to debunk “a false and inhibiting myth regarding nonstate actors [including
groups] and a related pretense of exclusion by identifying a large number of such actors . . . and a number of
specific forms of formal participation [by such nonstate actors]” in international law).
211 As one commentator has noted, a potential flaw in the definition of cultural property under UNESCO
is that only nation-states have the authority to designate what property is culturally significant; the group to
which the objects hold personal cultural significance has no formal voice. See Mastalir, supra note 193, at
1037 (“[T]he question regarding what cultural property should be protected by domestic and international
efforts remains unanswered.”). Another commentator argues that this is at least similar to group rights, as
compared to “internationalism,” an alternative view sometimes advocated, in which allowing “international
circulation of cultural properties can help to foster greater world cultural understanding.” Drimmer, supra note
204, at 744 n.370.
212 For example, the 1970 Convention defines “cultural property” as:
[P]roperty which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as
being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and which
belongs to the following categories: (a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals
and anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest; (b) property relating to history, including
the history of science and technology and military and social history, to the life of national
leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of national importance; (c) products of
archaeological excavations (including regular and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which have been
dismembered; (e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and
engraved seals; (f) objects of ethnological interest; (g) property of artistic interest, such as: (i)
pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any support and in any material
(excluding industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by hand); (ii) original works of
statuary art and sculpture in any material; (iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs; (iv)
original artistic assemblages and montages in any material; (h) rare manuscripts and incunabula,
old books, documents and publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary,
etc.) singly or in collections; (i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections; (j)
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Finally, one United Nations document explicitly recognizes a link between
cultural property rights and environmental sustainability. Notably, this
recognition extends to all local communities, not just to indigenous groups.
Principle 22 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
declares that “[i]ndigenous people and their communities, and other local
communities, have a vital role in environmental management and
development” and calls upon all nations to “recognize and duly support [these
communities’] identity, culture and interests and enable their effective
participation in the achievement of sustainable development.”213
C. Domestic Legal Protection of Local Communities and Cultures
1. Domestic Legal Protection of Local Communities Outside of the United
States
While still a rarity, a growing number of nations provide to communities
legal entitlements to resources or other ownership of property. The types of
legal protections on which these communities may rely are also varied.
Certain local communities in Brazil may be the best-known examples of
communal rights in CPRs. These communities hold exclusive-use rights to
certain areas of state-owned forests.214 While the Brazilian government retains
ownership of the forests, it granted the local communities the exclusive right to
harvest and sell the renewable resources found there, such as rubber and Brazil

archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives; (k) articles of furniture
more than one hundred years old and old musical instruments.
1970 Convention, supra note 204, at 234–36. An implementing country is expressly permitted to choose, as
has the United States, to enact a more restrictive definition. See infra note 233 and accompanying text
(discussing CPIA).
213 Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, adopted June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1 (1992). The Rio Declaration, adopted by the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, is a collection of non-legally binding, authoritative statements of global
consensus on environmental policies, reflected in twenty-seven “principles.” See Breckenridge, supra note
159, at 735–36.
214 Breckenridge, supra note 159, at 779 (citing Stephan Schwartzman, Extractive Reserves: The Rubber
Tappers’ Strategy for Sustainable Use of the Amazon Rainforest, in FRAGILE LANDS OF LATIN AMERICA:
STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (John O. Browder ed., 1989), and Stephan Schwartzman, Land
Distribution and the Social Costs of Frontier Development in Brazil: Social and Historical Context of
Extractive Reserves, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC BOTANY (Daniel C. Nepstad & Stephan Schwartzman eds.,
1992)).
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nuts.215 The rights to these renewable resources are held subject to the
requirement that the communities’ harvest practices remain “sustainable.”216
Some local communities in Indonesia also have been granted a similar right
to extract “cat eye resin” (used in incense, varnish, paint, and cosmetics) in the
forests of Sumatra.217 The legal status of this right has waxed and waned over
the years.218 While subject to Dutch colonial rule in the 1930s, local
community leaders negotiated the boundaries of a forest reserve that was
designated for customary local regulation.219 In 1991, however, the reserve
became a national park and large areas were reclassified as “State Production
Forest,” a designation that “implies that local use is strongly restricted (de
facto prohibited) and that the government may issue logging concessions.”220
Following lobbying efforts by a consortium of nongovernmental organizations,
Indonesia’s Minister of Forestry signed a decree in 1998 that “acknowledged
local people as the only beneficiaries of the management of” designated forest
areas.221 According to the decree, communities within the designated zone
were required to make a formal application to register their concession
rights.222 In fact, communities have not registered these rights.223 Even so, the
decree has resulted in governmental acceptance of arguably illegal local
community farming within the designated areas and extinguished the threat
posed by several planned commercial forestry enterprises.224
In Fiji, kinship groups hold collective rights to inshore reef-fishing
territories called qoliqolis, each of which consists of multiple family
subgroups.225 While customary law in Fiji vests local chiefs with the ultimate
authority to create rules governing the use of communal resources, “[a]ll

215

Id. at 779–80.
Id. at 780 (internal quotation marks omitted). The impetus for the Brazilian government to create this
legal regime originated, at least in part, with environmental groups in the United States lobbying Congress to
put pressure on Brazil by reducing its World Bank funding. Id.
217 See generally Kusters, supra note 160, at 428–29 (describing a process whereby local communities
negotiated for concession rights to harvest damar resin).
218 Id. at 428–29.
219 See id. at 429.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 435.
225 Lawson-Remer, supra note 153, at 10 (“Depending on the qoliqoli, the rights-holding unit is either the
yavusa (composed of 2-5 family sub-groups, called matanqalis) or the vanua, which is generally comprised of
between 5 and 14 yavusas.”).
216
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villagers participate in [the] monitoring and enforcement” of these rules.226
The collective property rights are formally recorded in a register maintained by
the Native Fisheries Commission. No individual—nor even the qoliqoli as a
collective—has the right to alienate any fishing rights; “individual use rights
accrue as part and parcel of clan group membership, which is transmitted
patrilineally.”227 Current efforts to strengthen this collective ownership regime
are supported by environmental groups who see it as the most attractive
strategy for regulating the fisheries, in light of the practical inability of the
Fisheries Department to effectively patrol the vast Fiji coastline, which
stretches more than 1.3 million square kilometers.228
Community ownership initiatives in Scotland have taken a different
approach entirely. There, a growing number of communities have formed
trusts to purchase crofting estates from private or government owners.229 “This
move to collective [private] ownership [by communities] places Scotland at the
‘cusp’, globally, of . . . ‘community-centric’ land reform.”230
2. Legal Protection of Cultural Property in the United States
The United States has been modestly supportive of the broader
international effort to protect cultural property. It has ratified both the 1954
and 1970 Conventions, discussed in Part III.B,231 and has also entered into
several bilateral agreements that protect cultural property.232 The United States

226

Id.
Id. at 10–11.
228 Id. at 13–14.
229 Mackenzie, supra note 161, at 320. “Crofting, as a form of land tenure, dates from circa 1800. A
crofter, as tenant, rents a small piece of land . . . for individual use from the landowner, and holds use rights in
common to, frequently, large areas of common grazing.” Id. at 320 n.1.
230 Id. at 320 (citing John Bryden & Charles Geisler, Community-Based Land Reform: Lessons from
Scotland, 24 LAND USE POL’Y 24 (2007)).
231 See United States of America Ratified Conventions, supra note 205; see also Treaties & Legislation,
SAVING ANTIQUITIES FOR EVERYONE, http://www.savingantiquities.org/heritagetreaties.php#Unidroit (last
visited May 17, 2011) (“[O]nly a handful of countries have joined the [1995] Convention.”).
232 For example, the United States has enacted specific trafficking statutes to implement obligations it has
toward certain countries. See, e.g., Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture or
Murals Act, Pub. L. No. 92-587, 86 Stat. 1297 (1972) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091–2095 (2006)) (making
illegal the importation and trafficking of cultural properties from Central and South America and the
Caribbean without approval of the country of origin’s government); id. § 2093(b) (providing for repatriation of
items seized pursuant to the Act).
227
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implemented the 1970 Convention by enacting federal legislation—the
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA)—in 1983.233
Within its own borders, the United States also has a great number of
domestic laws protecting cultural property. Early efforts were mainly aimed at
protecting “national treasures,” such as national historic buildings and sites.234
More recently, federal legislation has also been enacted to protect cultural and
archaeological artifacts located on federal land.235 A number of federal laws
also specifically aim to preserve the cultures of Native American tribes and
native Hawaiians.236
The most comprehensive examples of domestic cultural property protection
can be found in statutes enacted in the last few decades, such as the
Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA)237 and the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA),238 enacted in
233 Pub. L. No. 97-446, 96 Stat. 2329 (1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (2006)).
As expressly permitted by the 1970 Convention, CPIA restricts the definition of protected cultural property.
Id. § 2601(6).
234 See, e.g., Antiquities Act of 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–
433 (2006)) (providing legal protection against destruction of “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest” located on federally owned land); Historic Sites,
Buildings, and Antiquities Act, ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 461–467
(2006)) (setting forth the purpose to “preserve for public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of national
significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States”); National Historic Preservation
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006)) (providing for
the establishment of the National Register of Historic Places).
235 See, e.g., Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–mm (2006)) (establishing criminal penalties for, inter alia, the destruction
or unauthorized removal of archeological resources on federal land); Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act, Pub. Law No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
3013 (2006)) (creating a requirement that Native American tribes be consulted before the federal government
undertakes to excavate Native American human remains or cultural items on federal land and establishing
criminal penalties for the trafficking in such items).
236 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11701(2) (2006) (“The Native Hawaiian people are determined to preserve,
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territory, and their cultural identity in accordance
with their own spiritual and traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language, and social institutions.”). While
this Article focuses on the statutes that protect cultural property, other federal statutes aim to protect and
preserve these cultures outside of the tangible property context. See, e.g., Native American Languages Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 2901–2906 (2006) (protecting the right of Native Americans to speak and teach their native
languages). Others are a hybrid and vest some property-type rights (such as access to sites) with other types of
protections. See, e.g., American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006) (recognizing an
“inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian,
Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites”).
237 Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–mm (2006)).
238 Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2006)).

SAUNDERS GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/29/2011 11:54 AM

A SEA CHANGE OFF THE COAST OF MAINE

1369

1990. Both seek to protect and preserve archeological resources. ARPA does
this by prohibiting any excavation and removal of such resources from federal
or tribal land unless done in accordance with a permit issued for that
purpose.239 All materials recovered by a permit-holder remain the property of
the government.240 NAGPRA, on the other hand, actually vests ownership of
ancestral remains and related funerary objects in lineal descendants, if they can
be identified.241 If identification is not possible, an item becomes the
collective property of either the indigenous tribe on whose land the item is
found or the tribe having the closest relationship to it.242 Ownership of “sacred
objects” and “objects of cultural patrimony” are always vested in the tribe with
the closest relationship to the objects.243
IV. THE COMMONS AS CULTURAL PROPERTY
As discussed in Part II, research by social scientists concludes that, under
the right conditions, groups can cooperate and self-regulate to sustainably
manage CPRs under their control.244 Furthermore, CPRs can sometimes be the
most effective form of resource management.245 This conclusion stands in
contrast to the traditional assumption, which still permeates U.S. property law,
that resources can be managed only by private ownership or central
governmental control.246
Formal recognition of group rights to, or authority over, CPRs remains
rare,247 despite the fact that de facto group ownership and control—including
among Maine lobstermen, particularly before the advent of the new zone

239 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a). “Archaeological resources” are defined by the statute as “any material remains
of past human life or activities which are of archeological interest” that are at least 100 years old. Id. § 470bb.
Tribes are exempt from the permit requirement, as are individual tribe members if the tribe has enacted “tribal
law regulating the excavation or removal of archeological resources.” Id. § 470cc(g)(1).
240 Id. § 470cc(b)(3).
241 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(1).
242 Id. § 3002(a)(2)(A)–(B).
243 Id. “Because of the communal ownership rights in these cultural properties, and the inability of any
individual to dispossess the group of its ownership interests, NAGPRA prohibits any individual from
alienating covered items.” Drimmer, supra note 204, at 740 (footnote omitted).
244 Ostrom, supra note 144, at 251–52.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 A few exceptions are recounted above in Part III. The ocean waters that contain all Maine lobster
territories are legally “public property. . . . held in trust by the state for all citizens. . . . [A]ll citizens have
legal access to them.” ACHESON, supra note 9, at 24.
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licensing system—have been documented.248 In the United States, the
traditional options, private ownership or central governmental regulation,
continue to dominate the discussion at the policy-making level. Even in the
legal academic literature, private group cooperation and effectiveness are
studied and lauded as alternatives to legal paradigms, not as goods in and of
themselves that should be incorporated into, or protected by, existing legal
systems.249
As groundbreaking as it was for Ostrom’s work to disrupt the thenprevailing sole paradigm of natural resource management policy, entrenched
legal presumptions and norms are harder to displace. Perhaps in part for this
reason, deliberate institutional design has attempted to tinker with regulation
rather than more extensively overhaul or displace it—even in situations where
continued small-group management might be superior.250 Thus, in Maine, coregulation was introduced to vest lobstermen with formal rule-making
authority, but their authority is not absolute. Instead, it is highly circumscribed
and subject to being overridden by governmental authorities.251 Nor does
comanagement protect, or even recognize, the existence of customary fishing
territories.252
To the contrary, while incorporating successful cooperative management
techniques into existing regulatory regimes might be superior to traditional
top-down central resource management, these new institutions appear not to
encourage or preserve successful cooperative regimes that are already in
place.253 On the surface, traditional property regimes, predicated on the notion
of individual ownership, seem ill equipped to assimilate group-level rights and
management practices. As Professors Daniel Cole and Elinor Ostrom have
recently noted, “Property theory has not kept pace with the growth of empirical

248 See, e.g., id. (describing the local-level tradition of “‘harbor gang[s]’ that maintain[ lobster] fishing
territor[ies] for the use of [their] members”); Acheson & Brewer, supra note 31, at 40–41.
249 See supra Part II.B.
250 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 143; Acheson & Brewer, supra note 30, at 55.
251 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 97.
252 The zone boundaries were deliberately drawn to track customary territorial boundaries. See id. at 113.
However, there is no formal incentive for lobstermen to stay within these boundaries, as the zones do not
recognize any of the smaller territories located therein and the regulations associated with them expressly
permit a licensed lobsterman to do as much as 49% of his fishing outside of the zone in which he is licensed.
Id. at 112–13.
253 To the contrary, expressly legalizing behavior that is contrary to the customary system may directly
serve to undermine it. See supra note 181.
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and historical data on property systems.”254 In particular, legal scholars,
among others, “continue to rely on simplistic, outmoded and incomplete
models” that fail to account for contemporary commons research.255 If legal
scholars are resistant to incorporating new theories of property, lawmakers and
judges who rely on existing precedents are likely even more so.
Yet, American legal systems, particularly American property law systems,
do recognize rights belonging to pairs, groups, and collectives.256 There are
254 Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom, The Variety of Property Systems and Rights in Natural Resources, in
PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 1), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656418.
255 Id.
256 Some obvious examples include: common rights to property held by spouses, see James R. Ratner,
Community Property, Right of Survivorship, and Separate Property Contributions to Marital Assets: An
Interplay, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 993, 998 (1999) (distinguishing between joint property and community property,
both of which are jointly owned by spouses but are treated differently upon a spouse’s death, with joint
property automatically reverting solely to the surviving spouse while the dead spouse’s half-share of
community property must be devised by will or by intestate succession); common rights to real property or
associated rights, such as mineral rights, held jointly by multiple individuals, see James M. Acheson &
Julianna Acheson, Maine Land: Private Property and Hunting Commons, 4 INT’L J. COMMONS 552, 563
(2010) (describing various arrangements wherein multiple owners have different property interests in the same
parcel, such as owners of forestland selling development rights to conservation organizations, thereby creating
conservation easements, as well as forest landowners who sell recreational and hunting rights to individuals or
groups); Dorothy J. Glancy, Breaking Up Can Be Hard to Do: Partitioning Jointly Owned Oil and Gas and
Other Mineral Interests in Texas, 33 TULSA L.J. 705, 706 (1998) (describing potential difficulties of separating
joint ownership of multiple individuals through partition action); as well as common ownership of certain
property in condominiums, see Rose, supra note 16, at 139 (describing condominiums as a form of “[l]imited
common property”); Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical
Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 277 (2007) (“The condominium owner owns
his or her unit in fee simple absolute and shares an undivided interest in the common elements . . . as a tenant
in common with the other condominium owners.”). The same effect is also achieved through corporate
structures, such as in housing cooperatives. See id. (“[While] the owner of the building in a housing
cooperative is the cooperative corporation[, e]ach shareholder of the cooperative corporation is entitled to a
proprietary lease granting him or her the right to occupy a unit within the building for a significant period of
time . . . . Thus, the owner of a cooperative apartment is technically both the owner of shares in the
cooperative corporation and a tenant of that corporation.”). Dealing with collective rights has also been the
subject of legislative and other rule-making action, where special procedural mechanisms, most notably class
actions, have been designed to facilitate collective legal action. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (governing the
procedure of class action suits brought in United States federal courts); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515
(1975) (noting that an association may have standing to bring a claim based on injury of its members even
when there is no injury to the association as such).
On Matinicus Island itself there is a long tradition of “common” (private) ownership. The shorefront
was originally owned by a single settler, who deeded it to his heirs as undivided land. See ROGERS, supra note
1, at 16.

Today the shorefront is owned by many, the shares having been divided, sold and divided again
and again, each time making the shares smaller, until it is possible to own a share as small as
1/400th. That share allows the owner to build a house or shop . . . , but without clear title to that
particular piece. In essence, he owns 1/400th of everyone else’s land.
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even some examples of legislatures that will consider and enact fairly novel
strategies—with Maine among them, in adopting the comanagement system
for regulating the lobster industry—though admittedly they are far more likely
to implement new laws that are based on established legal models.257
Cultural property rights provide an excellent model that could be tailored
and adapted to recognize group management of CPRs. Casting the argument
in cultural property terms may be the best way for the collective management
structure of “commons” to achieve formal legal recognition. While cultural
property laws have been slow to expand, they have been treated with great
deference once enacted.258 Notably, this is so “even when those efforts have
conflicted with private property rights of a previously well established and
traditional nature.”259
Furthermore, while a community’s claim of a right to exclude rival
fishermen from a local fishing ground is not identical to the more commonly
recognized cultural property interest in “tangible, movable objects,”260 neither
does it take much imagination to consider it in the same terms. As it has been
broadly defined, cultural property can be any property, tangible or intangible,
having special significance to a defined group of people, whether or not the
group is vested with a traditional property interest.261 As shown in the
examples discussed in Part III, cultural property rights are perhaps best
characterized as a concept that has been legally recognized through a wide
variety of different domestic and international initiatives. Despite the myriad
ways of recognizing these claims,
[t]he idea that unifies all . . . [cultural property rights] initiatives is
that defined groups of people—such as the residents of a town, the
citizens of a state, the members of a tribe, or the citizens of a
nation—have identifiable interests in particular kinds of tangible or
intangible property which are legally cognizable and which should be
262
protected for the benefit of those groups.

Id. This system, “for over two hundred years[,] . . . has worked just fine on Matinicus.” Id.
257 In addition to conservatism and the “failure of imagination,” other pragmatic and political reasons may
underlie this phenomenon.
258 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 20, at 112 (“The courts have exhibited remarkable receptiveness to public
efforts to protect cultural property . . . .”).
259 Id.
260 Mastalir, supra note 193, at 1037.
261 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 20, at 110.
262 Id.
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So conceived, the concept of cultural property rights, even as currently
understood, is broad enough to encompass community rights initiatives.263
The identification of group members with the community, and their desire to
pass this identity to their children as a cultural heritage, not only encourages
cooperation and rule-following behavior by group members, but also gives rise
to a unique community culture. The CPR on which the group relies is crucial
to its group identity and its continued cultural existence. For
these
communities, like the Matinicus Island lobstermen, “[b]iological
resources . . . have special meaning . . . , differentiated from their value to the
public in general.”264 Such resources therefore can be conceived as the
“cultural property” of that community in much the same way that a tangible
sacred object is the cultural property of another group.265
Yet, concluding that the definition of cultural property is broad enough to
encompass community-level claims is not the end of the inquiry. The notion
that groups serving as de facto managers of CPRs could be vested with rights
modeled on existing cultural property rights initiatives only hints at when such
rights should be recognized and what form this recognition should take. I
attempt to analyze these questions below, both generally and with specific
reference to the lobbying effort now being advanced by the Matinicus Island
lobstermen.

263 Consciously extending this model would work well for such groups for several reasons. First, many of
these groups are precisely the same indigenous groups that are already the subjects of existing cultural
property rights. See, e.g., Berkes, supra note 162, at 66. The Canadian government signed a treaty with the
Cree that “specified and consolidated their land and resource use rights, [and] made provisions for regional
self-government” including self-regulation of many CPRs. Id. at 68. Some of these groups may already have
implicit recognition of their exclusive rights to manage resources to the extent that these resources are found
on reservations over which tribal sovereignty is expressly recognized. Second, by vesting rights at the group
level, cultural property rights expressly recognize, and potentially strengthen through that recognition, the
unique identity that many groups have developed based on their stewardship role. Third, a model of group
rights based on the special relationship between the group and the property interest provides a solid theoretical
framework for explaining why certain groups should prevail at the “expense” of other individuals, which has
been the basis for efforts opposing extending recognition of island subzones in Maine.
264 Breckenridge, supra note 159, at 776.
265 See, e.g., Graceann Hall, Oregon Natives Seek Return of Rare Meteorite, ALBION MONITOR (Apr. 3,
2000), http://www.albionmonitor.com/0004a/copyright/willamette.html (reporting that an Oregon tribe
brought a claim under NAGPRA, attempting to utilize the statute to regain possession of a meteorite that the
tribe has revered as a religious object since it first fell to Earth on Native land).
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A. When Cultural Property Rights in CPRs Should Be Recognized
Communities grow and shrink and even, with relative frequency, entirely
cease to exist.266 While often viewed as lamentable,267 this reality is generally
not legally actionable.
Certain small, insular communities, however, have a distinct culture that
may be of historical significance. In the case of communities that sustainably
manage CPRs, their continued existence will often be in the public interest.
Yet, this cannot be the only fact relevant to deciding whether to create a
“cultural” property interest. Just as other preservation efforts have been
criticized for impeding more desirable new alternatives, an overly broad
conception of community-level rights would have negative potential as well.
Some of the same factors that make small, close-knit communities efficient—
their insularity and homogeneity—could work against efforts to promote the
inclusive multicultural society that constitutes both a core value of the cultural
property rights movement and a normative value broadly woven through the
fabric of contemporary American law. Ideally, a framework for vesting
cultural property rights in nonindigenous communities should prevent the
extinction of unique communities that are lauded for their conservation ethic
and—at the same time—establish a standard for other collective efforts
(thereby helping to maintain a diverse collection of subcultures). Yet, any
framework should also guard against entrenchment of community values that
are antagonistic to tolerance and diversity.
One can imagine such an issue arising with some frequency in the context
of claims brought by small communities. While communities may be effective
at enforcing norms, the norms they enforce may or may not confer a net benefit
on the broader society.268 Whether it is in the public interest to favor
266 See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 176, at 91 (describing how all but six property owners
agreed to sell to their polluting corporate neighbor, but noting that “residents voted overwhelmingly not to
dissolve the town government, so technically Cheshire still exists and will be governed by its roughly fifteen
remaining residents”); see also ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4–5, 15–16 (describing the growth and decline in
population over two centuries and how neighboring Criehaven Island, which for many years “enjoyed a vital
growing population,” ceased to have any year-round inhabitants in the 1960s).
267 See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 176, at 144 (“[A] sense of community is obviously
something of great importance to many residents of small towns and urban neighborhoods.”).
268 Rai, supra note 165, at 85 (“[E]ven if a norm that is efficient for a particular group emerges, it may
create negative externalities. For example, the exclusionary behavior of a particular social group may be
efficient for that group, but it is not likely to be efficient for society as a whole.”); see also Samuel Bowles &
Herbert Gintis, Social Capital and Community Governance, 112 ECON. J. F419, F428 (2002) (“Communities
work because they are good at enforcing norms, and whether this is a good thing depends on what the norms
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recognition of a particular community’s preservation claim must begin by
taking account of the norms that would be perpetuated thereby. If the
community culture is one based on hegemonic exclusion, the community rights
claim may not be compatible with broader public policy—or constitutional—
principles. “When insider–outsider distinctions are made on divisive and
morally repugnant bases such as race, religion, nationality or sex, community
governance may contribute more to fostering parochial narrow-mindedness
and ethnic hostility than to addressing the failures of markets and states.”269
As a preliminary matter, then, a plausible community rights claim should
not have qualities that are inconsistent with core constitutional values270 or be
antithetical to the multicultural foundations of most cultural property efforts to
date.271 Preserving and recognizing the value of individual groups with
distinct cultures will not serve the broader interest in diversity and
multicultural pluralism when the culture of a group is inconsistent with that
interest.272
A related way of evaluating whether a group’s preservation claim should be
granted is to ask whether groups that are effective because they are
homogenous, and can thus preserve a common group interest based on that

are.” (emphasis added)); Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of
Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 225–26 (1994) (discussing as economically inefficient the
norm of racial discrimination); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1044–63 (1995) (discussing group norm
enforcement of racist values); Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 176, at 81 n.16 (“The downside [of
communities] is that [they] may also enforce ‘bad’ norms such as racial segregation.”). But see ROSE, supra
note 7, at 88 (“Yet another . . . safeguard on local government . . . [is] ‘exit’—the ability to abandon something
when dissatisfied—and it exists most distinctively at the local level. . . . [P]eople have a choice about the
community in which they live . . . .”).
269 Bowles & Gintis, supra note 268, at F428.
270 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (gender discrimination); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial discrimination).
271 See, e.g., Drimmer, supra note 204, at 696–97, 725–27 (describing the general multiculturalist
rationale for international cultural property rights initiatives); id. at 740 (“NAGPRA’s purpose is
fundamentally multiculturalist; it was created to reverse the historical attitude that indigenous minority
cultures, particularly Native American tribes and native Hawaiian organizations, were not worth preserving.”);
Mastalir, supra note 193, at 1063 (“In the case of NAGPRA, the arguments used to support the request for
repatriation of cultural property to Native Americans were founded on human rights principles. Recognition
of human rights was the basis offered for enactment of the law during public hearings and upon introduction of
the bill on the floor of the House and Senate.”).
272 See Drimmer, supra note 204, at 749 (“To best achieve the multiculturalist goals of cultural property
laws, it seems axiomatic that boundaries must be drawn to discourage—or at least to not encourage—the
perpetuation of violent cultures or cultural practices that threaten the existence of other cultures or human
collectivities.”).
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homogeneity, on balance have something significant to contribute to the larger
community or the public interest generally. When the community culture and
values are not inconsistent with the public interest in multiculturalism,
pluralism, and diversity, general principles favoring multiculturalism would
tend to support its preservation. When the values of the community culture
contribute to the broader public good, there is a doubly strong public interest in
preservation. But when the cultural hostility to outsiders has no purpose other
than exclusion for its own sake, preservation of the community may be neither
a good policy goal nor constitutionally permissible.
The Matinicus Island fishing community is homogeneous from an
economic point of view based on its single-minded focus on, and interest in,
lobster fishing.273 This makes it a strong candidate for preservation: “fisheries
and marine environments are extremely complex, and . . . at least in some
instances, community-level management is likely to deal with these
complexities more efficiently, and more ecologically soundly, than can
individuals”274 or the state.275 As different lobster communities demonstrate, a
firm boundary that excludes outsiders may be more effective at limiting
resource extraction than one that is not able to deter encroachment by
outsiders.276 Furthermore, the smaller and more close-knit the group, the more
likely it is to “agree on more nuanced and intricate sets of rights and
responsibilities,” which may also lead to more effective conservation of the
resource.277
273 It is also true as a factual matter that Matinicus Island is racially homogenous (white) and excludes
those who are not considered “kin.” However, the racial composition is better understood as a historical
byproduct of Maine’s generally homogenous and white population, than as an aspect of the community
culture. Indeed, “kin” is understood by Islanders to include those who may marry in from “outside.” There is
no evidence that an individual of another race who married in could not be recognized as a kinsman and
become a fully accepted member of the community. Nor is the community generally organized around a
principle of racial discrimination. Its exclusion is not based on race but on factors that may correlate to race.
See generally ROGERS, supra note 1.
274 Rose, supra note 16, at 176 & n.157 (citing Rieser, supra note 43, at 824); see also, e.g., supra notes
147–153.
275 See, e.g., Houseal et al., supra note 151; Western et al., supra note 151, at 5, 6 n.46.
276 See, e.g., ACHESON, supra note 9, at 78–79, 143; see also Rose, supra note 16, at 177 n.158 (citing
Acheson to make this same point).
277 Rose, supra note 16, at 177 & n.159 (citing Rieser, supra note 43, at 826–27) (“[C]ommunity
management [is] more nuanced than government regulation, including ITQs.”); see also id. at 177 & n.160
(citing Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 631, 640–41, 652–55
(1996)) (“Another environmental law scholar . . . makes the case that at the landscape level, we might also get
more environmental mileage out of community efforts than individual ones, for many of the same reasons:
purely individual actions may overlap and interact poorly, whereas individuals within communities can work
out quite intricate sets of internal rights, responsibilities, and overarching norms of expected give and take.”).
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The isolated nature of the Island fishery and its strong connection with the
community, and vice versa, explains the conservation ethic of the Matinicus
lobstermen. In general, some form of this ethic can be found throughout many
communities in the fishing industry, as it directly correlates to the economic
incentive to preserve and enhance an income stream over the long term.278 But
the motivation of a single individual to preserve his own income stream cannot
be compared to a group’s motivation to preserve a way of life for the next
generation. The interest shared by the Islanders in a future income stream is
instrumental to achieving the goal of community preservation, which cannot be
quantified or understood in purely economic terms, even if its achievement is
almost entirely economically dependent.
Channeling this survival instinct and the strong conservation impulse that
accompanies it may be the most effective way to solve conservation
conundrums like the one inherent in the Maine lobster fishery. One more or
less intractable conservation issue that has plagued Maine regulators is the
successful imposition and enforcement of trap limits.279 As lobstermen
themselves recognize, per-person trap limits have no real impact if the number
of license holders continues to increase.280 There must be a limit on the total
number of traps set. Small island communities sometimes will be better
situated both to formulate trap limits and to enforce them effectively.281
In general, the historical existence of self-governing, extralegal, close-knit
communities in the Maine lobster fishing industry may account for its success,
in conservation terms, over the years. Scientific knowledge is not always
incorporated quickly into law. In Maine, most of the lobster regulations
enacted during the last century were the product of scientific research and
recommendations.282 But in each instance, it took years, if not decades, before
legislation was enacted.283 Yet, in certain instances, lobstermen voluntarily
began adopting the measures advocated by scientists and other lobbyists long
278

ACHESON, supra note 9, at 212.
Id. at 98; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text (describing the increase in the total number
of traps in the wake of the enactment of a per-person trap limit into law).
280 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 98.
281 In theory, such communities may attempt to expand their borders as the size of the group grows and
thus increase trap numbers through this growth. However, there is a limit on how large such communities can
grow and still maintain the other features that cause them to remain viable as efficient close-knit communities;
if they grow too large to monitor themselves and work collectively in an effective way, they simultaneously
become worse at managing the resource. If their current borders are recognized and “fixed,” this will
incentivize the group to formulate norms discouraging overgrowth.
282 Id. at 91–93.
283 Id. at 93.
279
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before their enactment into law.284 They did so in cases where the predicted
conservation outcomes benefitted them. In this way, the lobstermen furthered
their communities’ interests by preserving a way of life for their posterity,
while simultaneously benefitting the larger society by conserving the resource
that made that way of life possible. This public interest should weigh strongly
against competing claims to the resource by encroaching groups that are not as
conservation-oriented or conservation-motivated.285
Recognizing rights in conservation-oriented groups could also incentivize
other groups to create or promote a more well-defined conservation ethic. The
creation of a secure property right would give such communities, as owners, a
further incentive to conserve resources and use them efficiently, while at the
same time eliminating encroachment by outsiders.286 Depending on how such
284

See, e.g., supra note 33 and accompanying text.
Of course, whether environmental concerns justify restricting the use of particular property may itself
be a first-order question. In some situations, it is possible to imagine that the community claim, even if
conservation oriented, might conflict with another use of the property that is deemed to be a higher and better
use. Cf. Stephen Sussna, The Concept of Highest and Best Use Under Takings Theory, 21 URB. LAW. 113,
115–16 (1989) (“[The] highest and best use often involves complex juggling of aesthetic, economic,
environmental, legal, practical, and social forces.”). With respect to the particular claim being advanced by
Matinicus Islanders, of course, the only two uses that are incompatible with the exclusive use desired by
Matinicus lobstermen are (1) lobster fishing by others, and (2) no lobster fishing at all. (Other uses, such as
boating through the area or other types of fishing, presumably would not be impacted by vesting exclusive
lobster fishing rights in Matinicus Islanders.) While other lobstermen may be able to prove a claim that they
will suffer some financial impact from being excluded from the Island fishery, that will be true whenever more
restrictive policies are imposed. With limited resources, the public interest in conservation will often outweigh
the economic harm suffered by a small number of individuals in the short-term based on new use limitations.
As for an outright ban on lobster fishing, which would visit economic harm on Matinicus lobstermen as well as
their competitors, it could be argued that this is an even better way to conserve the resource. On the other
hand, this might result in the loss of certain local knowledge that might be valuable for long-term conservation.
Regardless, it is hard to imagine Maine public policymakers adopting this type of policy because of the likely
substantial economic impact such a moratorium or ban would have on an industry that, for many, defines the
state. In any case, a fishing moratorium is certainly not the current policy, which seeks to balance the
competing interests of various groups of lobstermen with the environmental impact concerns, albeit in a
manner that is arguably less effective than a comprehensive scheme that incorporates recognition of more
subzones in perimeter-defended areas.
In addition, while Maine might consider other more classic regulatory measures—such as a broad
lobster fishing moratorium or severe trap limits—history demonstrates that enforcement would be difficult.
Indeed, perhaps for this reason, Maine has demonstrated its commitment to local resource management (and
local self-enforcement in addition to marine patrol enforcement) by enacting the comanagement zone system.
If local resource management—rather than some other type of top-down regulatory system—is indeed
preferable, then the interests of the less cooperative lobstermen in nucleated gangs should yield to the public
interest in resource conservation.
286 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 9 (“Since it is not in the rational best interest of an owner to damage his
own property, most renewable resources owned privately are used efficiently and conserved.” (citing James M.
Acheson, Management of Common-Property Resources, in ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 351 (Stuart Plattner
285
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a right was structured, and on what basis it was granted, the potential to obtain
a property interest in a CPR might motivate groups to form or to reorganize in
ways that would result in broad public benefits.
Finally, in terms of determining whether to recognize such a right, the
potential loss of conservation-oriented practices should be taken into account.
If the legal right to exclusive lobster fishing is not vested in the Matinicus
Island fishing community, or protected on its behalf, the entire Island
community, along with its local knowledge (perhaps including unique
conservation-oriented fishing practices), may cease to exist.287 This is not only
true in the esoteric sense that the culture of Matinicus Island will be radically
altered if its residents no longer define themselves as “lobstermen” as they
have for generations. In the case of Matinicus Island, unlike some other towns
that have lost a longstanding industry, it is likely also literally true.288 The
offshore Island, currently isolated to the point where it has only monthly
contact with the mainland during the winter, cannot sustain a community
without a full-time fishing industry upon which its residents can depend.
Without an exclusive fishing boundary, the community may be forced to
disband, with many or most residents dispersing to other places where they are
able to earn a living.289 Their fishing territory would then be utilized by
ed., 1989); Bonnie J. McCay, Everyone’s Concern, Whose Responsibility? The Problem of the Commons, in
UNDERSTANDING ECONOMIC PROCESS 189 (Sutti Ortiz & Susan Lees eds., 1992))); Kusters, supra note 160, at
435 (noting that, in a particular instance, government support of local community rights discouraged corporate
expansion and strengthened local communities’ sense of security). But see Acheson & Acheson, supra note
256, at 556 (noting that the local Maine community understanding of “traditional [extralegal] rights” may lead
to significant backlash against an individual exercising a “legal” property right, suggesting that the actual
impact of legal recognition will likely depend on public perception (internal quotation marks omitted from first
quotation)).
287 Such an “all or nothing” claim can be framed in a manner analogous to the cultural protection of
Native American languages, which will be lost forever if not preserved. See supra note 236 (citing Native
American Languages Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2906 (2006)).
288 Cf. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 176 (describing the destruction of a small community by
its polluting corporate neighbor).
289 While the community is currently very small—and likely will have to remain so to be sustainable—
nothing suggests it will cease to exist so long as lobster fishing remains a viable occupation. Indeed, for those
committed to lobster fishing as an occupation, it is a good location, and would be even more so if the Island
were to gain exclusive rights to fish within the traditional territory. Moreover, the community conservation
ethic can be passed on to new members, some of whom might move from outside the community. Indeed, the
conservation-oriented ethic might attract certain like-minded individuals from outside, as it did with current
resident Nat Hussey, who now combines his environmental law practice with lobster fishing. See ZeroCarbon Lobsters, NAT HUSSEY, http://nathussey.com/zclobsters.html (last visited May 17, 2011) (describing
his “zero-carbon” lobster fishing business, “[h]arvesting lobsters by hand in a traditional rowboat”); Law, NAT
HUSSEY, http://nathussey.com/law.html (last visited May 17, 2011) (describing his law “practice in marine
resources and fisheries issues, and land use matters of concern to working waterfronts and our small island
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coastal fishermen from nucleated territories that are likely to have a less
imperative conservation ethic. Sustainable practices and knowledge vested in
the community of fisherman might well be lost forever.
These criteria, which make for a fairly strong community conservation
claim by Matinicus Island lobstermen, will not be present in the claims of
every group. Indeed, even most groups of Maine lobstermen are likely to have
weak claims when viewed under these criteria. As discussed in Part I, the
Matinicus Islanders are one of only a few remaining island communities of
lobstermen. Most lobstermen fish out of mainland harbors with nucleated
territories whose borders are fuzzy and which overlap many others. The
members of these gangs still identify themselves as members of groups. Some
of these individuals may even experience this sense of group identity very
strongly. But, in many cases, members of these lobster gangs do not even
know all of the other members well, much less have a defined community that
transcends working hours and encompasses dependents.290
On the other hand, the dire nature of the situation currently faced by the
Matinicus lobster fishing community may indicate that Matinicus Island is
likely to be less conservation oriented than other small island fishing
communities. For example, the two Maine islands that have already achieved
subzone recognition have been able to make stronger claims as conservationfocused communities. These subzones were expressly created as resource
conservation zones and did not need to rely on “community” as a proxy for
conservation.291 Matinicus Islanders, by contrast, do not want to accept the
same trap limits that the other two islands have accepted because they fear they
will be unable to make a sufficient living at those levels.292
Monhegan Island is able to sustain itself with less income from its lobster
fishery because it also has a significant summer tourist industry. Because it
requires less income from the fishery, it has less incentive to sacrifice longcommunity” and noting recent cases he has worked on, including a case “to fight the shutdown of Matinicus
lobstering grounds in 2009”).
290 See ACHESON, supra note 9, at 74–75 (noting that in the mainland harbors he studied, “the amount of
interaction among fisherman is far less than it is on the islands” and that “many fishermen in these harbors do
not know each other well”). This reality probably makes it less likely that these lobster gangs would even
bring a community-conservation claim. The same factors that make a community efficient may also give it an
advantage in terms of mobilizing to protect its interests.
291 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 50–51, 60–61, 67–68.
292 Goodnough, supra note 1 (noting that Matinicus Island lobstermen do not think they should have to
accept trap limits as low as those of Monhegan Island because, unlike Monhegan Island, Matinicus Island has
no tourist industry on which it can fall back).
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term sustainability for short-term income.293 But, even so, it appears that on
balance Monhegan, not Matinicus, is likely better positioned than most
communities to conserve effectively. Despite only fishing about half the year,
its members are close-knit and the community is tightly integrated because its
members also work together in the Island’s summer tourist industry.
Still, despite the unflattering comparison with Monhegan’s (alreadysuccessful) claim, Matinicus Island’s claim is fairly compelling. Matinicus
Islanders are much more conservation- and community-oriented than nearly
every other existing lobster gang, almost all of whom have nucleated territories
and a weak sense of community, with limited interaction outside of work, no
group cohesion, and no potential for monitoring if the licensing system
continues to erode the customary boundaries. Moreover, finding a novel
conservation strategy may be imperative if the Matinicus Island community is
to survive. At some point, the public benefits of saving a particular community
will be marginal and not worth the effort of recognizing that group’s territorial
claim.294 Matinicus Island arguably is not such a community. Its continued
success would provide some benefit to the public, even if only as a living
example of sustainable resource management practices and techniques.
Undertaking an analysis of the costs and benefits of a novel conservation
strategy should be a prerequisite for any formal determination of whether to
validate a community conservation claim. If applied systematically, the
analysis should assist in assessing the strength of these efforts to be vested with
rights akin to cultural property rights. Conscious consideration of these criteria
would also deepen lawmakers’ understanding of the public policy interests
inherent in such claims and allow them to see beyond the “special interest”
label that often accompanies them.295 For example, Matinicus Islanders are
most likely to succeed in their effort to gain recognition of their community
interest if they can demonstrate that this interest also serves the public, and the
broader community of lobstermen, through the conservation benefits that could
293 See generally ACHESON, supra note 9, at 58–61 (discussing and analyzing the Monhegan Island lobster
fishing community).
294 Arguably this may be the dividing line between nucleated and perimeter-defended territories, since the
monitoring ability (and associated ability to enforce group norms) is weak. Island communities also have not
experienced the same levels of trap escalation as a result of stricter entry requirements. See id. at 46
(“[I]slanders do not feel the same pressure to increase the area they fish.”).
295 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747–48 (2011) (“As the
number of groups in the public limelight has increased, so has anxiety about the group-based identity politics
on which civil rights have historically been based. Many Americans view civil rights as an endless parade of
groups clamoring for state and social solicitude.”).
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be expected to result. Analyzing a community-level claim like a cultural
property claim, particularly with a sophisticated understanding of the economic
incentives for conservation at play in small, close-knit, and isolated
communities, allows for a fuller understanding of the principles at stake than
does viewing the claim only as a zero-sum distribution of “benefits” to certain
lobstermen at the economic expense of others.
B. Possible Methods of Recognizing a Community-Level Right
Assuming that some sort of community-level right should be recognized,
such a right could be structured in various ways. Each possibility has both
advantages and drawbacks. For example, as a general matter, any “right” that
is granted could either permit the state to maintain its ownership, and therefore
its ultimate control over the community’s “property,” or it could actually vest
the community directly with an ownership stake.296 The former has the
advantage of allowing the state to reverse itself, or revise the conditions
associated with recognizing a community’s interest, without the financial,
political, and legal obstacles associated with unraveling a property interest
once created.297 On the other hand, the stronger and more secure the property
interest granted, the greater the incentive for resource conservation by the
communal owners.298
1. Zoning or Similar Initiatives
The most obvious way the Matinicus Islanders could gain state-sanctioned
authority to exclusively use their traditional territory is by successfully
obtaining a formal designation as a subzone. This is the method they are
currently pursuing, at least as a preliminary strategy.299

296 Compare, e.g., Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–mm (2006)
(ownership interest in property retained by federal government), with Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2006) (collective property interest held by tribes).
297 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928–29 (1997) (“[P]ublic employees who can be discharged
only for cause have a constitutionally protected property interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without
due process . . . .”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985) (holding that civil
service employees have a property right to continued employment); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32
Cal. 3d 60 (1982) (“[I]ntangible assets [including those created by contract or statute] are subject to
condemnation [proceedings].”).
298 See supra note 286.
299 Auciello, supra note 1 (quoting Matinicus sternman Nat Hussey as predicting that the subzone
proposal will likely “go to the Legislature,” although “DMR could conceivably do this under their regulatory
authority” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Not only is subzone designation the easiest way for the group to achieve its
goal, both in terms of effort and political capital, there is also some precedent
for it. The subzones already created around Monhegan Island and Swan’s
Island effectively recognize those Island communities’ traditional perimeterdefended boundaries. Unfortunately for Matinicus Islanders, they will have to
overcome the more recent recommendation by the subzone committee task
force not to approve the creation of any future subzones.300
Were the Matinicus Island lobstermen able to achieve the exclusive right to
fish their territory via subzone designation, this method of recognizing the
community’s traditional boundaries would have a number of advantages. To
begin with, the community might be able to achieve subzone recognition
relatively quickly, giving it the best chance for economic sustainability.
Because subzones already exist and are part of the current zone system, the
Marine Patrol would be able to adjust almost immediately to policing the
borders on the same basis and pursuant to the same authorities that are already
in place. If enforcement were to continue on the same terms, this would give
the Islanders considerable autonomy.301 While the traditional extralegal
boundaries have been threatened by the Marine Patrol’s failure to enforce
them, the Marine Patrol has not, to date, directly interfered with any group
norms that are not illegal.302 Thus, to the extent that a subzone was created on
the same basis as the existing larger zone, the only change for Island
lobstermen would be formal recognition and policing by the Marine Patrol of
their borders. All other norms would presumably be unaffected by that
change.
The negative aspects of subzone recognition relate primarily to the
unknown variable of subzone-specific requirements, which have been imposed
in the other two subzones.303 If Matinicus Islanders were given the opportunity
to obtain subzone recognition only if they also accepted, for example, more
severe trap limits or special apprenticeship rules, a downward spiral could
300

See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
The enforcement costs to the state of Maine should also decrease. In general, one benefit of collective
ownership rights is the need for minimal state regulation and enforcement. See Lawson-Remer, supra note
153, at 13 (“Pursuing marine resource conservation by strengthening collective ownership rights is an
attractive strategy for environmental [groups in Fiji] in light of the limited capacity of the state to effectively
enforce fishing regulations.”).
302 To the contrary, “[a]mong state fishery officials, there has been a tacit acceptance of the traditional
territorial system. . . . [I]t has generally been accepted as long as violence and destruction of property are kept
to a minimum and do not come to public attention.” Acheson & Brewer, supra note 30, at 38.
303 ACHESON, supra note 9, at 61, 67–68, 224–25.
301
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result. If the community members were divided in opinion regarding the
feasibility of economic survival with such restrictions, their cohesiveness
might unravel, rendering them unable to agree on the best strategy to pursue.
They might, for example, be unable either to rally around a proposed subzone
or to present a strong front to lobby the legislature for an alternate strategy.
This could undermine or destroy the community more quickly than its own
inaction.
Similarly, even if Islanders accepted a subzone with restrictions as a means
of saving the community, the subzone restrictions might still be accepted only
grudgingly by most, or over the strong dissent of a significant minority of the
community. The result could be internal discord, with factions forming over
the status of these restrictions and their enforceability as community norms.
Enough discord could fracture the group’s sense of community, undermining
its ability to work efficiently in general, including with respect to other norms
that previously were well accepted.304
While a subzone appears to be the most straightforward way to obtain the
type of formal territorial recognition they are seeking, some Islanders have
already recognized that the current subzone taskforce recommendation creates
a potentially insurmountable obstacle to subzone recognition, at least by the
Maine Department of Marine Resources. It may be that directly lobbying the
Maine legislature would provide a better chance of success, both for the
community and in general.
2. Statutory Possibilities
As illustrated by the examples in Part III, cultural rights initiatives have
taken various forms. Likewise, there are many different approaches that a
legislature could take in creating a statutory scheme that recognizes
community-level rights. While these approaches might also be subdivided into
many different types of schemes, they can broadly be generalized either as (a)
community-specific statutes or as (b) statutory schemes vesting rights in any
and all communities or groups that meet specified criteria.

304 Cf. id. at 63 (noting that, on Criehaven Island, “the sense of community appears to be waning rapidly,”
which “has resulted in an increased willingness to deviate from the rules”).
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a. Community-Specific Approach
The first broad category of legislation includes any statutes vesting specific
communities with unique rights to specified property. In the case of Matinicus
Island, such a statutory initiative would presumably resemble the statute
establishing the conservation zone around Swan’s Island, which was enacted
before the zone licensing system was established. Most likely, such legislation
would be passed as an amendment to the zone management law, with the
Matinicus Island fishing territory designated as an official zone or subzone.
To protect the Island lobstermen’s exclusive right to their traditional
territory, at a minimum, such legislation would have to bar anyone not in
possession of a subzone license from fishing in the subzone.305 It would also
need to impose a restriction against issuing subzone licenses to applicants who
are not Island residents. In light of the recent shooting, which arose in
connection with a feud between different factions over this very issue,
imposing a membership requirement consistent with Island norms might prove
somewhat tricky.
Many issues of legal interference with community norms would be averted
if the statute restricted the territory to use by the community and formally
vested the community with the right to determine fishing eligibility. Another
alternative would be to establish a set number of subzone licenses for the
Island and permit the entire community (or an Island zone council) to
determine how to distribute them. This alternative would vest the Islanders
with less autonomy and encroach upon their ability to self-regulate, but would
help mitigate the risk of eventual overfishing.306
Indeed, one of the primary issues with which policymakers would have to
grapple is whether such a statute should recognize a community-level property
right, similar to NAGPRA,307 or, alternatively, vest governing authority over
the fishing territory at the community level. The two existing Island subzones
do neither, but instead, in a manner similar to ARPA, protect the resource
305 This would be unlike the current system in which a license holder from one zone is permitted to set
traps in another zone, so long as he sets no more than 49% of his traps outside of his home zone. See id. at
112.
306 Another possibility would be a formal apprenticeship program or a requirement that the community or
subzone committee establish a program under the comanagement rules. There might be benefits to allowing
the group to make such determinations. In light of the concerns expressed about community conservation and
establishing a business for the next generation, the Islanders’ community would likely develop a system that
worked best for it in terms of training its next generation of lobstermen.
307 See supra notes 238, 271, and accompanying text (discussing NAGPRA).
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against exploitation by continuing to vest the ultimate property interest in those
resources—and the territory containing them—in the state government.308
b. Broad Scheme Setting Forth Specified Criteria
The other possibility, which would be a more radical departure from any
existing law in the United States, would be for a legislature to pass a statute
that vests any group meeting specified criteria with a legal property interest
(or, alternatively, with broader authority to self-govern and self-regulate the
designated property, which they might be deemed to hold in trust).309 From a
purely political perspective, this seems to be an unlikely possibility; it is
difficult to imagine the political will required to undertake such a radical shift.
Further, in the case of lobster fishing, it would effectively overhaul the current
zone system, which takes no cognizance of any community rights in customary
boundaries. If it were feasible, however, clear precedent for this type of
scheme exists in the various international conventions discussed in Part III.
Like those conventions, this scheme could define property that may be
claimed as cultural property. The international conventions define categories
of property quite broadly but permit state parties to draft their own domestic
implementing legislation with narrower definitions. In the context of a
community-conservation statute, the designated categories of property, such as
fishing rights, could first be defined more narrowly and expanded over time, if
warranted. This path would be more difficult to navigate than a communitytargeted scheme, as it would no doubt be challenging to craft a statutory
definition that is neither over- nor under-inclusive and which could precisely
target the characteristics of small groups or communities that cause them to
contribute significantly to the public interest.
On the other hand, general statutory recognition of a small group’s right to
stake property or property-like claims (such as legally enforceable usufructuary
claims) would eliminate the type of politics that led to the controversial
recommendation of the subzone task force committee. Similar political
obstacles might impede the efforts of future groups forced to lobby separately
every time a situation arose where legal recognition might be warranted.
Indeed, even one or two successful efforts would not guarantee success for
later groups, just as the successful Monhegan Island and Swan’s Island

308
309

See supra note 237 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA).
See Breckenridge, supra note 159, at 777–78.
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precedents did not stop the subzone task force from recommending against
further subzone recognition.
3. Other Methods of Recognizing Group-Level Rights
Because wildlife and fisheries are publicly owned in Maine,310 some sort of
public law solution, such as the possibilities outlined above, is likely the only
viable solution for lobstermen seeking rights to their traditional fishing
territories. In the case of other CPRs, however, quasi-private ownership
solutions may be available, like those recently undertaken by several local
communities in Scotland.311
Local communities or groups could adopt a similar strategy in the context
of a private resource (such as Maine forestland, which is nearly all privately
owned312). Hybrid ownership schemes are also possible. A private entity or
organization, such as a conservation group, might purchase a property and
retain the right to alienate but grant exclusive-use rights to small groups that
can sustainably manage and benefit from them. Any of these “private”
structures could be encouraged by legislation offering benefits, such as tax
breaks or other incentives, for property whose resources are managed by small
groups using sustainable practices.313
CONCLUSION
In the decade since Professor Rose proposed that recognition of communal
property rights should occur in the next generation of property law, little
indicates that such a movement is truly afoot. Instead, this Article has noted
that the customary territorial system of the Maine lobstermen—one of the
institutions lauded by Professor Rose and others for its superior communal
management of natural resources—is now threatened by a new wave of
government regulation, among other things. We hardly appear closer to
recognition of a community-level property right that could be used to save
310

Acheson & Acheson, supra note 256, at 553.
See supra notes 161, 229, and accompanying text.
312 Acheson & Acheson, supra note 256, at 554.
313 Likewise, use rights could be granted on private property, as in certain places in Europe where
“owners of estates may have the rights to timber and agricultural products, but peasants have the de facto right
to gather mushrooms, nuts, and firewood, and to use the land for grazing.” Id. at 565. Courts in the United
States have also sometimes recognized customary use rights of private property. See, e.g., McConico v.
Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244 (1818) (concluding that hunters have the right to hunt on unenclosed private
property).
311
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communities whose conservation values make them excellent stewards of a
resource they know better than anyone else. This Article has suggested that
such a right, which would enable certain communities to retain their resourceconservation values, should be considered as a tool by anyone interested in
conservation, including legislators and lobbyists.
A study of the growing literature on CPRs both demonstrates the need for
such a right and reveals why these communities are worthy of preservation.
But the “community” as an institution and potentially important repository of
property rights in the next generation requires further study. In particular, the
identity aspects inherent in community—and which may account for the
efficiency of many close-knit groups—should be more overtly integrated into
institutional design analysis.
In the immediate aftermath of the shooting of Chris Young, the instinctive
response of Maine authorities to view Matinicus Island lobstermen as a single
legal entity based on their status as a lobster fishing collective may have been
correct (even if the manifestation of that instinct—punishing the entire
community for the criminal misconduct of a few—may not have been).314 In
appropriate instances, collective property rights should be recognized in
communities. Property law—constantly evolving in response to ever-changing
political realities—is up to the challenge.315

314 The Islanders’ lawsuit against the commissioner was quickly settled, and no judgment on the merits
was reached. See Walter Griffin, Court Allows Lobstermen Back to Work, MORNING SENTINEL (Waterville,
Me.), July 24, 2009, at A2. The State’s prompt agreement to lift its ban might (but, of course, might not)
indicate that it believed it was on weak legal ground and that its actions would be deemed illegal.
315 The contemporary focus on resource conservation is the best example of a complete reversal in policy
manifesting itself as a legal change. For example, property doctrines in different types of systems generally
favored use, rather than conservation. Common law systems, for example, permitted adverse possession to
occur only when the possessor used and improved the property. In usufructuary systems, absolute ownership
can never occur, but usufructuary rights are lost if they are not exercised through continuous use of the
property by the holder.
The ability (or more frequently, inability) of courts and legislatures to adapt to changing norms and
needs is perhaps not more critical in any other legal arena than the one regulating the physical environment,
which has a mortal impact on every citizen.

